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The U.S. military has an increasing requirement to prepare for and conduct  
urban operations (UO).  This UO requirement spreads across the spectrum of conflict, 
from high intensity combat to peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, often 
simultaneously.  Regardless of which portion(s) of the warfare spectrum U.S. forces are 
involved in, urban engagements are inevitable and present significant challenges.  
Superior standoff weapons ranges and combined arms tactics are quickly negated in the 
confined terrain of the urban environment.  Often considerably more challenging is 
differentiating the enemy from noncombatants.  Conventional forces normally have two 
options:  (1) the threat of a violent response (passive) or (2) the use of deadly force 
(active).  These two extremes have virtually no middle ground.  The reluctance of 
military and/or peacekeeping forces to employ deadly force on unconfirmed enemy 
targets can create a vulnerability.  This vulnerability may be mitigated by equipping a 
small combat unit (SCU) with a viable alternative to deadly force—non-lethal weapons 
(NLWs). 
Using an imperfect friend or foe identification modeling framework within an 
agent-based simulation (ABS), an NLW is used to interrogate (determine the intent of the 
person in order to identify friend or foe) rather than attempt to incapacitate a target.  To 
determine the impacts of employing NLWs in an urban combat environment (with 
civilians on the battlefield), three factors were varied across 15 design points:  the ability 
of U.S. military forces to positively identify a target, the range of the selected NLW, and 
the number of NLWs in an SCU.  By replicating each design point and analyzing the 
resulting output data, the following insights were discovered:  the use of NLWs does not 
degrade U.S. survivability; NLWs are essential to neutralizing suicide attacks; and NLWs 
















































The reader is cautioned that the computer programs presented in this research may 
not have been exercised for all cases of interest.  While every effort has been made, 
within the time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and logic 
errors, they cannot be considered validated.  Any application of these programs without 
additional verification is at the risk of the user.1 
                                                 
1 Charles A. Sulewski, “An Exploration of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the Army’s Future Combat 
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With the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, the  
U.S. military has had an increasing requirement to prepare for and conduct  
urban operations (UO).  This UO requirement spreads across the spectrum of conflict, 
from high intensity combat to peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, often 
simultaneously.  The contemporary operating environment facing the U.S. military is 
characterized by militias, armed gangs, and terrorist cells.2  Recognizing that the superior 
weapons and combined arms tactics of U.S. forces are virtually negated in an urban 
environment, cities will likely become the battleground of conflicts.  Perhaps the most 
challenging aspect of UO is the difficulty in differentiating combatants from 
noncombatants. 
The mingling of civilians and combatants forces the military to adopt more 
restrictive rules of engagement (ROEs) to reduce the risk of civilian casualties.3  
Problems and incidents arise when Soldiers are unable to positively identify a potential 
enemy or hostile intent.  Conventional forces armed only with traditional weapons 
normally have two options:  (1) the threat of a violent response (passive) or (2) the use of 
deadly force (active).  These two extremes have virtually no middle ground.  The 
reluctance of military and/or peacekeeping forces to employ deadly force on unconfirmed 
enemy targets creates a vulnerability.  This vulnerability may only be rectified by giving 
Soldiers an alternative to deadly force that is more effective than merely the threat of a 
violent response.  Equipping a small combat unit (SCU) with non-lethal weapons 
(NLWs) may be that alternative. 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) defines NLWs as “weapons that are 
explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel, 
                                                 
2 Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. and Steven Metz, “Nonlethality and American Land Power:  Strategic 
Context and Operational Concepts,” Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 
1998, p. 7.  Retrieved 10 May 2006 from the World Wide Web at http://handle.dtic/mil/100.2/ADA299046. 
3 Joseph Siniscalachi, “Non-Lethal Technologies:  Implications for Military Strategy,”  
Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, AL, 1998, p. 25.  Retrieved 10 May 2006 from 
the World Wide Web at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA399046. 
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while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to 
property and the environment.”4  Although the U.S. military employs a wide variety of 
NLWs in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, very little research has been done to 
determine the most appropriate NLW to use across the spectrum of operations, especially 
combat.  Many may argue that NLWs have no place in combat—unfortunately, this 
ignores the reality that noncombatants have become more prevalent on the modern 
battlefield.  In the 1950s, noncombatants accounted for about one-half of all casualties; in 
the 1980s, the rate rose to about 80%.5 
As indicated by a capability requirement, the U.S. Army’s Future Force Warrior 
(FFW) program (aimed at providing unsurpassed individual and squad lethality, 
survivability, communications, and responsiveness) is seeking a non-lethal solution.6  
NLWs may add flexibility to combat operations and enhance force protection by 
providing a tool that friendly troops can use to engage threatening targets with reduced 
risk of noncombatant casualties and collateral damage.  This capability requirement is 
further elaborated in the Ground Soldier System (GSS, the successor to the  
FFW program) Capability Development Document: 
The Soldier and small unit will need to employ non-lethal effects 
in urban and complex terrain where the enemy may intermingle with 
noncombatants.  Small units may have missions to control an area where 
strict rules of engagement may preclude injury to noncombatants.   
Non-lethal effects will aid the ground Soldier to see, understand and act 
first by providing the capability to dislocate enemy forces hiding in 
restricted and urban terrains or among the general population.7 
                                                 
4 United States Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard, NLW-Tactical Employment of 
Non-Lethal Weapons, FM 3-22.40, MCWP 3-15.8, NTTP 3-07.3.2, AFTTP (l) 3-2.45, and USCG  
Pub 3-07.31, Multiservice publication, January 2003, p. I-1. 
5 Siniscalachi, p. 45. 
6 The Wexford Group International, Inc., The United States Army Future Force Warrior Concept 
Capability Plan for the Small Combat Unit, (Columbus, GA:  September 2005), p. 22. 
7 “Future Force Warrior (FFW),” U.S. Army Natick Soldier Center (NSC).  Retrieved May 2006 from 
the World Wide Web at http://ffw.natick.army.mil/content.htm. 
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Unfortunately, the lack of a solution is best summed up by U.S. Air Force  
Colonel Joseph Siniscalachi: 
While employment of non-lethal technologies is maturing for 
tactical applications, the evolution of non-lethal technologies for the more 
general warfighting applications is still being conceptualized.  It is here 
where advocates claim that non-lethal technologies may make the greatest 
contribution to future warfighting.8 
The first objective of this research was to select an appropriate NLW and 
employment tactic to be used for operations that span the spectrum of operations—from 
combat operations to humanitarian missions.  The NLW selected for combat (and other) 
operations for this research was the XM303 (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1.  XM303 
 
The XM303 is similar in appearance to the M203 grenade launcher.  In place of a 
grenade launcher, it uses compressed air to propel a paintball-like projectile at point 
targets at a range of up to 50 meters.  Soldiers may use the NLW as an interrogation asset 
to determine intent.  This principle is similar to the way police typically yell “halt or I 
will shoot.”  In which case, the alleged criminal (or suspect) is to remain in place with the 
threat of being shot if the individual does not comply.  An NLW may be used to convey 
the same message.  The reaction to the “message” (being hit with a paintball) will be used 
to determine the intent of the targeted individual.  Compliance consists of the targeted 
individual immediately assuming the prone position (surrendering).  Failure to comply 
will immediately subject the individual to lethal fire.  This concept must be clearly 
communicated to the local populace through an extensive Psychological Operations  
(Psy-Ops) campaign before hostilities commence, in order to facilitate this understanding. 
A scenario consisting of a night UO in the Caspian Sea area of operations, 
specifically Azerbaijan, was created within the agent-based simulation (ABS) 
                                                 
8 Siniscalachi, p. 4. 
 xxiv
Pythagoras.  The intent was to determine the impact of employing NLWs in an urban 
combat environment (with civilians on the battlefield).  Insight was determined by using 
an imperfect friend or foe identification modeling framework and varying three factors: 
the ability of U.S military forces to positively identify a target, the range of the selected 
NLW, and the distribution/number of NLWs in an SCU.  After running the model  
150 times, the output data were analyzed and resulted in the following insights: 
• Blue survivability does not suffer from using NLWs.  Quick, lethal 
response (if noncompliant), superior optics/engagement ability, and  
FFW body armor offset the risk of lethal fire returned by the (once 
unconfirmed) target. 
• It is better to engage with NLWs at 25 meters versus 50 meters.  Getting 
closer allows for better identification (before engaging and allowing 
subsequent return fire if engaged with NLWs). 
• When it is extremely difficult to differentiate combatants from 
noncombatants, it is better to have more NLWs (increased distribution) 
available to the SCU than to engage at an extended range. 
• In conditions where it is very easy to discriminate friend from foe, the use 
of NLWs may cause slightly more civilian casualties than not using an 
NLW.  This is associated with a higher probability of noncompliance than 
the probability of misidentifying.  If you shoot enough civilians with 
NLWs, a few are (unfortunately) bound to be noncompliant.  In such 
environments, Soldiers should consider this characteristic before 
employing lethal means. 
• Stopping a Suicide Bomber is crucial to operational success, especially 
when it is difficult to identify combatants from noncombatants.  It is not 
difficult to understand why.  Any NLW capability dramatically reduces 
the chance of a successful suicide attack, regardless of  
identification ability. 
 xxv
• Each increase in NLW capability (e.g., distribution and range) results in 
additional Hostile Civilian surrenders. 
• NLWs can be used to interrogate rather than incapacitate.  When 
employment focuses on determining intent rather than delivering sufficient 
force/pain to incapacitate, accidental deaths and animosity are  
greatly diminished. 
Civilians, and adversaries who are virtually indistinguishable from civilians, will 
likely remain a fixture on the battlefield for quite some time.  Military operations must 
consider both the enemy and the often unwilling participants.  Under the provisions of the 
Law of Armed Conflict, we have an obligation to safeguard noncombatants from 
unnecessary suffering.  While lethal means must always be the default method of force, 
NLWs may significantly reduce civilian casualties without reducing our  




























According to UN estimates, the urban population of developing countries 
increases by about 150,000 per day; projections indicate . . . three-fifths of the 
world’s population . . .will live in urban areas by 2015. 
 
Handbook for Joint Urban Operations, 
Joint Staff, J-8, Land and Littoral Warfare Assessment Division 
17 May 2000 
 
It's the only place they—our future adversaries—can take our technology and 
mute it. . . .  We avoid the cities, but that is where we will be taken—so we had 
better learn to fight and win in the city. 
 
General Charles C. Krulak, USMC 
At 12th BRIMS Conference 
12-15 May 2003 
A. THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 
The conclusion of the Cold War sparked a revolution in U.S. military operations 
and strategy.  Many thought that the conclusion of the Cold War would initiate a dramatic 
drawdown of U.S. military forces and a period of military inactivity.  With the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, conventional warfare would no longer be characterized by large-scale, 
force-on-force armored divisions battling in relatively open terrain.  Unfortunately, the 
end of this rivalry did not signal a decrease in U.S. military operations; only a decrease in 
the importance attached to some of the traditional principles of warfare, especially mass 
(concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time).9  The bipolar characteristic of 
the Cold War actually imposed structure on the world by buffering tensions and conflict 
between nonstate actors.10  Some political scientists believe that the rise of nonstate actors 
will dominate the future global scene, with its many religious factions and cultural 
rivalries.  Militias, armed gangs, and terrorist cells may dominate contemporary 
                                                 
9 United States Army, Operations, Field Manual 3. Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 2001, p. 4-13. 
10 Joseph Siniscalachi, “Non-Lethal Technologies:  Implications for Military Strategy,” Air War 
College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, AL, 1998, p. 24.  Retrieved 10 May 2006 from the  
World Wide Web at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA399046 
2 
asymmetric conflict.11  This has, and will probably continue to translate to increased  
U.S. military operations. 
Cities will likely become the strategic centers of these conflicts.  Combat will 
occur in urban areas because of the concentration of national power there and because our 
enemies, recognizing the complexity of urban warfare, will choose to fight there rather 
than face American military superiority on open terrain.  Our superior standoff 
engagements may not be appropriate in urban engagements, even if they are substantially 
more precise than those currently available today.  Urban Operations (UO) will involve 
“face-to-face confrontations and close-in solutions.”12  Under some circumstances, the 
identities of our adversaries may be somewhat uncertain, causing the use of deadly force 
for purposes other than self-defense to be further constrained by the rules of engagement 
(ROEs).13 
B. TRANSFORMATION AND NON-LETHAL WEAPONS (NLWs) 
REQUIREMENT 
The Army’s Future Force Capstone Concept describes how the U.S. Army 
proposes to meet the future combat needs of the Contemporary Operating Environment 
(COE).  This document outlines an aggressive transformation program to leverage current 
and emerging technology to develop what is being termed the Future Force.14  This  
Future Force is envisioned to be a “more strategically responsive, deployable, agile, 
versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable force; effective in all situations from major 
combat operations (MCO) to homeland security.”15  A key component of this  
Capstone Operational Concept is the precondition that this force must be prepared to 
                                                 
11 Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. and Steven Metz, “Nonlethality and American Land Power:  Strategic 
Context and Operational Concepts,” Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 
15 June 1998, p. 7.  Retrieved 10 May 2006 from the World Wide Web at 
http://handle.dtic/mil/100.2/ADA299046. 
12 Ibid., p. 25. 
13 United States Army, Marine Corps, and Navy, Non-Lethal Weapons:  Tactical Employment of  
Non-Lethal Weapons, FM 3-22.40 (FM 90-40), MCWP 3-15.8, NTTP 3-07.3.2, AFTTP (1) 3-2.45,  
USCG PUB 3-07.31, 2003, p. III-1. 
14 United States Army, “The Army in Joint Operations:  The Army’s Future Force Capstone Concepts 
2015-2024,” TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0. 
15 The Wexford Group International, Inc., p. 7. 
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simultaneously and subsequently conduct stability operations.16  To achieve Future Force 
objectives, the Army seeks to synergize combat platforms, weapons, robotics, and 
support equipment with the most important component of the transformation—the 
Soldier. 
At the 2003 Infantry Conference at Fort Benning, Georgia, General Kevin Byrnes, 
the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commander, noted that recent 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan reinforced the notion that the caliber of the Soldiers, 
not the caliber of the weapons, makes the biggest difference in battle.  Additionally, as 
the likelihood of the U.S. military being involved in large force-on-force engagements 
decreases, more emphasis must be placed on the contributions of the individual Soldier.  
This realization is characterized in the Soldier as a System (SaaS) initiative.  According 
to Byrnes, this is the most important program in the Army.17 
In order to achieve the Army Transformation goals described in the  
Army Capstone Concept, a Future Force Warrior (FFW) Small Combat Unit (SCU, 
roughly equivalent to a platoon) must possess enhanced lethality, mobility, survivability, 
interoperability, and adaptability to operate across the entire spectrum of operations, from 
humanitarian and peacekeeping operations to full-scale combat.  One of the most 
challenging capability requirements for the FFW is the ability to achieve desired  
non-lethal effects at ranges of up to 25 meters (see Figure 2 for this and  
other requirements).18 
                                                 
16 “The Army in Joint Operations (The Army’s Future Force Capstone Concept 2015-2024),” 
presentation by BG(P) David Fastabend.  Retrieved 10 May 2006 from the World Wide Web at 
http://www.blueskybroadcast.com/Client/Army_Stratcom_7.05/docs/fcs.chalk.talk23AUG05.pdf. 
17 COL Charles Durr and David J. Libersat, “Soldier as a System (SaaS),” Infantry Bugler,  
Winter 2004.  Retrieved 11 May 2006 from the World Wide Web at http://www.infantryassn.com/ 
Bugler%20issues/Inf_2004_4.pdf. 
18 The Wexford Group International, Inc., p. 22. 
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Figure 2.  FFW Capability Requirements for All Soldiers 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
As previously stated, the U.S. military has an increasing requirement to prepare 
for and conduct UO.  This UO requirement spreads across the spectrum of conflict, from 
high intensity combat to peacekeeping and humanitarian missions (Stability and Support 
Operations—SASO), perhaps simultaneously.  Regardless of which portion(s) of the 
spectrum of warfare U.S. forces are involved, urban engagements are inevitable and 
present major challenges.  Superior standoff weapons ranges and combined arms tactics 
are quickly negated in the confined terrain of a complex and usually unfamiliar urban 
environment.  Differentiating between the enemy and civilians in this environment will 
endanger our forces and their mission.  Conventional forces, armed only with traditional 
weapons, normally have two options:  (1) the threat of a violent response (passive) or  
(2) the use of deadly force (active).  These two extremes have virtually no middle ground.  
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The reluctance of military and/or peacekeeping forces to employ deadly force on 
unconfirmed enemy targets creates a vulnerability.  This vulnerability may be mitigated 
by equipping an SCU with a viable alternative to deadly force—NLWs. 
As indicated by a capability requirement to have non-lethal effects, the FFW 
program is still seeking a non-lethal solution.  This lack of a solution is best summed up 
by U.S. Air Force Colonel Joseph Siniscalachi: 
While employment of non-lethal technologies is maturing for 
tactical applications, the evolution of non-lethal technologies for the more 
general warfighting applications is still being conceptualized.  It is here 
where advocates claim that non-lethal technologies may make the greatest 
contribution to future warfighting.19 
D. SCOPE 
 Although the U.S. military employs a wide variety of NLWs in humanitarian and 
peacekeeping operations, very little research has been done to determine the most 
appropriate NLW for use across the spectrum of operations, especially combat.  Many 
may argue that NLWs have no place in combat—unfortunately, this ignores the reality 
that noncombatants have become more prevalent on the modern battlefield.  In the 1950s, 
noncombatants accounted for about one-half of all casualties; in the 1980s, the rate rose 
to about 80%.20 
 Peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti highlight the 
difficulties of adopting our existing military tools to new strategic settings.21  Under the 
provisions of the Law of Armed Conflict, we have an obligation to safeguard 
noncombatants from unnecessary suffering.22  While lethal means must always be the 
default method of force, NLWs may significantly reduce civilian casualties without 
reducing our combat effectiveness (CE).  The objectives of this research are:  select and 
equip the Soldier with the most appropriate NLW for the FFW SCU; develop an 
imperfect identification framework; explore the tactics and distribution of NLWs in an 
                                                 
19 Siniscalachi, p. 4. 
20 Ibid., p. 45. 
21 Ibid., p. 80. 
22 United States Army, The Law of Land Warfare, Field Manual 27-10, (Washington, D.C.:   
U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), p. 4-13. 
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SCU; explore the advantages of using NLWs in combat operations; and examine the 
consequences of not using NLWs. 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
 To determine the impact of equipping the FFW SCU with NLWs, this research 
will first explore the background and potential future of NLWs.  The NLW deemed most 
suitable for combat operations will be modeled within a simulation.  This simulation will 
attempt to capture an imperfect identification framework and the functionality of 
employing an NLW in an urban scenario to explore the effects of NLWs.  Analysis will 
follow by varying a multitude of inputs within the simulation to gain insight on the 
potential impact of equipping the FFW SCU with NLWs. 
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II. NON-LETHAL WEAPONS (NLWs) 
The principle that civilians must be protected lies at the heart of 
International Law of Armed Conflict. 
 
Donald Rumsfeld 
U.S. Secretary of Defense 
19 February 2003 
 
The development and acquisition of non-lethal weapons systems will 
expand the number of options to commanders confronted with situations in 
which the use of deadly force is inappropriate. 
 
General Michael Hagee 
Commandant, USMC 
2 April 2003 
A. NLWs DEFINITION AND BACKGROUND 
Typically, when one thinks of NLWs, riot gas, pepper-spray, tasers, and stun guns 
come to mind.  Some of these weapons (especially tasers) have frequently been in the 
media and have come under scrutiny since their inception—usually because the “non-
lethal” weapon had lethal consequences.  There is generally an abundance of confusion 
surrounding the terminology used to describe weapons designed without the purpose of 
killing.  In fact, numerous terms (less-than-lethal, prelethal, disabling, soft kill, etc.) are 
used by different agencies to describe desired/intended effects of these weapons.  
Although the term NLW does imply the incapacity of lethal effects, the U.S. Department 
of Defense (DoD) has adopted the term “non-lethal” as the approved name for these 
weapon systems and defines it as: 
. . .weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to 
incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent 
injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the 
environment. . . .  Non-lethal weapons are intended to have relatively 
reversible effects on personnel and materiel.  The term ‘non-lethal’ does 
not mean zero mortality or nonpermanent damage; these are goals and not 
guarantees of these weapons.23 
                                                 
23 United States Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard, NLW-Tactical Employment 
of Non-Lethal Weapons, (FM 3-22.40, MCWP 3-15.8, NTTP 3-07.3.2, AFTTP (l) 3-2.45, USCG  
Pub 3-07.31), Multiservice publication, January 2003, p. I-1. 
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NLWs are employed for a wide variety of objectives:  discouraging aggression, 
limiting escalation of hostile actions, taking military action when lethal means are not 
authorized, protection, and incapacitating/disabling personnel and equipment (refer to 
Appendix A, DoD Policy for NLWs).24  NLWs are generally categorized by three core 
capabilities:  counter-personnel, counter-materiel, and counter-capability.  This research 
focuses on the use of counter-personnel NLWs for small unit urban combat operations.  
These types of weapons may use kinetic rounds (soft ammunition, like sponge rounds or 
rubber bullets), chemicals (such as oleoresin capsicum (OC), commonly called  
pepper-spray), directed energy (lasers, acoustic, electromagnetic, and microwaves), or 
electrical charges (tasers, stun gun).  Effects range from passive (a warning from a loud 
speaker or laser dot), to sensory discomfort (eyes stinging from pepper-spray), to physical 
pain (hit with batons or shot with soft bullets), and unfortunately, sometimes to injury or 
death.  The most notorious and arguably disastrous example of military use of an NLW 
occurred in October 2002, when Russian forces used the chemical fentanyl against 
Chechen hostage-takers in a Moscow theater.  Unfortunately, nearly 130 of the 800-900 
hostages died of overdoses and an undisclosed number were left with permanent 
disabilities.25  Obviously, extreme care must be exercised in the employment of NLWs. 
The U.S. military has successfully employed NLWs in numerous past operations 
and continues to use them in support of current operations in Iraq.  In 1995, Marines in 
Somalia successfully used NLWs in support of humanitarian missions (Operation United 
Shield).26  In 1999, during international peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, U.S. forces 
used NLWs to disperse crowds and protect themselves without killing those they were 
                                                 
24 Department of Defense Directive #3000.3, “Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons,” (Washington, D.C.:  
Department of Defense Printing Office), Sections 4.4 and 4.5. 
25 Retrieved 10 May 2006 from the World Wide Web at http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Moscow_Theatre_Siege. 
26 Personal notes taken from Penn State University’s online Non-Lethal Weapons Certificate Program,  
Module 1, January-February 2006. 
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sent to protect.27  NLWs have also been successfully employed in military prison 
compounds, such as Abu Ghraib in Iraq.28 
B. WHY DO U.S. FORCES NEED NLWs? 
Just as policemen carry firearms, so must our military use weapons of 
great power.  The need for that will not soon vanish, but as society 
evolves, there will frequently be a need for some middle ground, when we 
wish to stop people from doing things we find wrong, but to do so without 
creating widows and orphans in the process.29 
Tom Clancy 
Author, 1999 
As previously mentioned, there was a 30% increase in noncombatant casualties 
between the 1950s and the 1980s.  This alarming trend continues to rise as increasing 
numbers of refugees, immigrants, and noncombatants are caught in the crossfire of civil 
and ethnic strife and battles involving states, rogue states, failed nation-states, and 
terrorists.30  Regardless of which portion of the spectrum of warfare U.S. forces may be 
involved in, urban engagements are inevitable and present major challenges.  Unable to 
use superior standoff and combined arms tactics, SCUs are forced to adapt to the 
confined terrain of a complex, urban environment.  Urban operations are further 
complicated by the difficulty associated with separating the opposing leadership and 
armed forces from the noncombatants,31 as adversaries often blend in with the local 
populace of innocent civilians.  Some sectors of the population may even rise against 
U.S. forces and become active participants in acts of violence, as seen in Somalia in 
October 1993.32 
                                                 
27 Personal notes taken from Penn State University’s online Non-Lethal Weapons Certificate Program,  
Module 1, January-February 2006. 
28 Interview between LTC Ray Smith, Requirements Officer, Capabilities and Requirements Division 
at the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate and the author, September 2005. 
29 Quote taken from the Forward of John B. Alexander, Future War:  Non-Lethal Weapons in  
Twenty-First Century Warfare, (New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 1999), p. xi. 
30 Margaret-Anne Coppernoll, “The Non-Lethal Weapons Debate,” 1999.  Retrieved 10 May 2006 
from the World Wide Web at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/1999/spring/art5-SP9.htm. 
31 Ibid., p. 7. 
32 Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down:  A Story of Modern War, Penguin Books, 1997. 
10 
The mingling of civilians and combatants will force the military to adopt more 
restrictive ROEs or new strategies to reduce the risk of civilian casualties while at the 
same time maintain effectiveness against the threat.  The U.S. military is currently 
restricted in the tools it can employ, which means that intervention is constrained.33 
U.S. forces are very reluctant to engage unconfirmed enemy targets and civilians 
for good reasons.  One source of this reluctance stems from the set of guidelines that all 
U.S. Soldiers are bound to follow—ROEs.  ROEs form the guideline for the employment 
of lethal force, but, more importantly, are designed to prevent unintended casualties 
(especially civilian) and collateral damage.34  Problems and incidents arise when the 
situation is unclear, such as when a Soldier is unable to positively identify a potential 
enemy or the hostile’s intent.  Stress, duress, and uncertain conditions can lead the most 
experienced and disciplined Soldiers to make mistakes, which can jeopardize goodwill 
efforts and degrade our international image.  Not only can mistakes cause obvious 
damage to the target, the psychological and judicial consequences could be career- and 
life-altering to the trigger-puller.  This fear often makes Soldiers reluctant to use lethal 
means, which clearly limits Soldiers’ capabilities and effectiveness, as well as potentially 
increasing their vulnerability.  This vulnerability may only be rectified by giving Soldiers 
an effective alternative to deadly force that is more effective than merely the threat of a 
violent response.  The effective use of NLWs may overcome these deficiencies and 
perhaps even provide a greater tactical and strategic edge.35 
Achieving military objectives without the use of lethal force is not a new concept, 
especially in peacekeeping operations.  During Operation United Shield, Marines in 
Somalia claimed that NLWs were a valuable asset for humanitarian operations and, if 
required, could be successfully applied to other missions throughout the spectrum of 
conflict.36  NLWs may add flexibility to combat operations and enhance force protection 
                                                 
33 Siniscalachi, p. 25. 
34 United States Marine Corps, Inter-Service Non-Lethal Individual Weapons Instructor Course 
(INIWIC), Fort Leonard Wood, MO, Chapter 8, p. 4. 
35 Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. and Steven Metz, pp. 14-15. 
36 Personal notes taken from Penn State Univeristy’s online Non-Lethal Weapons Certificate Program,  
Module 1, January-February 2006. 
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by providing a tool that friendly troops can use to engage threatening targets with reduced 
risk of noncombatant casualties and collateral damage.37  This capability requirement is 
further elaborated on in the Ground Soldier System (GSS, the successor to the FFW 
program) Capability Development Document: 
The Soldier and small unit will need to employ non-lethal effects 
in urban and complex terrain where the enemy may intermingle with 
noncombatants.  Small units may have missions to control an area where 
strict rules of engagement may preclude injury to noncombatants.   
Non-lethal effects will aid the ground Soldier to see, understand and act 
first by providing the capability to dislocate enemy forces hiding in 
restricted and urban terrains or among the general population.38 
While lethal means must always be the default method of force, NLWs may 
potentially reduce civilian casualties without risk of friendly casualties (associated with 
misclassifying a hostile as a neutral, allowing the enemy to engage).  They may also 
provide a more effective means to capture targets alive (if required).  Employing these 
means may demonstrate a high moral position and a commitment to contain the violence, 
which could possibly lead to increased public support, both domestically and abroad, 
while avoiding the unrest associated with unintended civilian casualties (such as depicted 
in the book and subsequent movie, Black Hawk Down).39   Unfortunately, clear guidelines 
for the effective employment of non-lethal force throughout the spectrum of operations 
have not been established. 
While police actions and peacekeeping missions have clear applications for the 
use of NLWs, this research explores the role of NLWs in actual urban combat operations 
at the small unit level.  More specifically, does equipping a FFW SCU with NLWs 
increase CE by reducing civilian casualties without increasing (and possibly even 
decreasing) friendly casualties?  In order to begin addressing the shortcomings 
surrounding our understanding of the use of NLWs, models and simulations should be 
leveraged to gain insight and aid in the decision-making for the selection and 
                                                 
37 United States Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard, NLW-Tactical Employment 
of Non-Lethal Weapons, (FM 3-22.40, MCWP 3-15.8, NTTP 3-07.3.2, AFTTP (l) 3-2.45, USCG  
Pub 3-07.31), Multiservice publication, January 2003, p. I-1. 
38 TRADOC System Manager-Soldier (TSM-S), Capabilities Development Document for Ground 
Soldier System (Draft), 13 June 2005, p. 55. 
39 Bowden, 1997. 
12 
 
employment of NLWs.  Of course, before this concept can be modeled and analyzed, a 
candidate weapon system and munition must be selected. 
C. NLW SELECTION 
Five factors were considered when selecting a NLW to for combat operations: 
1. Versatility – The NLW must be suitable across the entire spectrum of 
operations, from combat to humanitarian missions.  This factor also 
considers combat load and logistics support. 
2. Ease of Employment – Transitioning from lethal fire to non-lethal must 
not detract from the combat mission. 
3. Performance – This rather broad category covers things such as effective 
range, accuracy, rate of fire, reload time, weight, etc. 
4. Safety/Public Acceptability – Using an NLW that maims is perceived to 
potentially permanently injure, or deemed cruel.  Considerations include 
probability of accidental death from the munition, as well as the possibility 
of confusing non-lethal with lethal means. 
5. Other – Includes advantages/disadvantages not covered in the previous 
categories, such as multifunctionality, tailorable effects, training 
requirements, etc. 
When all of these factors were considered (see Appendix B, NLW Selection 
Criteria, for details), the NLW selected for combat (and other) operations for this 
research was the XM303 (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3.  XM303 
The XM303 is similar in appearance to the M203 grenade launcher.  In place of a 
grenade launcher, it uses compressed air to propel a paintball-like projectile at point 
targets at a range of up to 50 meters.  The primary intended effect is blunt,  
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trauma-induced pain.  Secondary effects are achieved through the projectile payload, 
which, upon impact, dispenses washable paint, permanent paint, or OC. 
D. NLW EMPLOYMENT/TACTICS 
The XM303 system was selected for this research effort with a recommended 
modification and accompanying employment tactic.  Instead of trying to induce 
incapacitation through pain, it is proposed that Soldiers may use the NLW as an 
interrogation asset to determine intent.  This principle is similar to the way police 
typically yell “halt (or get down on the ground) or I will shoot.”  The alleged criminal (or 
suspect) is to halt or remain in place with the threat of being shot if the individual does 
not comply.  An NLW may be used to convey the same message.  The reaction to the 
“message” (being hit with the XM303 non-lethal round) will be used to determine the 
intent of the targeted individual.  During a phone interview in November 2005, Sid Heal, 
who was involved with Operation United Shield in Somalia, discussed how the use of 
NLWs can determine a suspect’s intent: 
A shot of OC into the face of a civilian who crosses a posted ‘no entry’ 
line can give you the ability to read his intention.  If he clears his eyes and 
keeps charging into the no-man’s zone, then you know he didn’t just 
overlook or misunderstand the sign, for you have put the message in 
universally understood terms.  If he runs away, you know that you have 
saved him from a worse outcome.  If he gets up and runs at you, that is his 
informed choice.40 
When a target is engaged with the XM303, the target will act either in compliance 
or not in compliance.  The compliance action must be known for this tactic to be 
effective.  Compliance consists of the targeted individual immediately assuming the 
prone position.  Conceptually, a two-man team could then approach and make an 
assessment to either release or secure and evacuate the individual to the rear.  Failure to 
comply will immediately subject the individual to lethal fire.  This concept must be 
clearly communicated to the local populace wherever NLWs are employed.  An extensive 
Psychological Operations (Psy-Ops) campaign must be launched before hostilities in 
order to facilitate this understanding.  The longer U.S. military forces use this tactic, the 
                                                 
40 Phone interview between Charles “Sid” Heal, Commander, Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department and 
the author, November 2005. 
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more compliant noncombatants (and even combatants) will be.  Once this practice is 
established, future operations will require less extensive Psy-Ops efforts. 
Once a Soldier determines hostile intent, lethal means should and will be 
employed during combat operations.  The challenge is to determine hostile intent quickly 
and at a safe distance.  If a Soldier only has lethal means, when a possible threat is 
detected, ambiguous intent may allow the “threat” to delay engagement and get quite 
close to a Soldier (think of a suicide bomber).  If a Soldier fires early (before hostile 
intent is clearly established), it could potentially cause an unintended consequence (e.g., a 
civilian gets shot for not understanding the situation).  Many times warning shots are not 
authorized (some consider it the first shot of a firefight), further jeopardizing the safety of 
the Soldier.  In that case, a Soldier has very little time and standoff distance to deal with 
the target once intent is unambiguously determined. 
A NLW essentially enables a Soldier to interrogate a possible threat through 
engagement.  Compared with the typical time needed to determine hostile intent (if it can 
be) with only lethal means, a Soldier employing an NLW could determine hostile intent 
several times over.  This may increase the standoff distance and engagement time in 
which the Soldier can engage the target. 
To further improve the effectiveness of this tactic, the air pressure (currently  
300 psi) of the XM303should be reduced to minimize the possibility of injury.  By 
reducing the potential for causing civilian casualties, a small unit can continue on its 
mission rather than be delayed by caring for and evacuating casualties.  This casualty-
reducing tactic may also demonstrate good will to the host nation and to the world.  
Rather than trying to incapacitate (via pain), the NLW is used primarily as an 
interrogation tool, and therefore causing significant pain (associated with the 
conventional goal of NLWs—to incapacitate) is unnecessary and should not degrade the 
weapon’s performance at less than 50 meters. 
Another tactical employment concept for this NLW is to fill the munition with a 
permanent infrared (IR) dye, thereby marking the individual (unbeknownst to them).  The 
rationale for this is that with conventional dye, the target could simply duck out of sight 
and change clothes.  With the IR dye, the marked individuals do not realize the necessity 
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of changing—Soldiers will be able to identify them with IR devices.  When previously 
engaged personnel return to the area of operation, a very clear intent of hostile actions is 
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III. MODELING NLWs IN COMBAT OPERATIONS 
All models are wrong. Some are useful. 
 
George Box 
Professor of Statistics, University of Wisconsin, 1979 
 
Reality is complex, but models don't have to be. 
 
Craig Reynolds 
Computer Scientist and a Pioneer of Agent Modeling, 1987 
 
A. MODELING “COMBAT” 
Some may claim that modeling combat is easy—F.W. Lanchester developed 
differential equations in 1916 to mathematically compare losses of opposing forces on the 
battlefield (with simplistic underlying assumptions).41  Although simple  
Lanchester Equations are useful for demonstrating some features of combat (e.g., the 
value of concentrating forces), they furnish a limited basis for describing most combat 
situations.  A considerable weakness is that Lanchester Equations assume that the sides’ 
strengths can be characterized by scalar quantities.  A considerable challenge awaits the 
analyst trying to assign values to sides with a different organization, mix of equipment, 
and doctrine. More difficult still is the treatment of qualitative factors, such as the effects 
of terrain or the differences in competence between equally sized and equipped forces of  
different nations.42 
DoD uses models and simulations (M&S) to enhance/supplement training for 
Soldiers, units, and staff; explore future capabilities, tactics, and force structure; and as an 
aid to the acquisition process.  All three types of simulation models employ some level of 
abstraction—because, as retired Army General Paul Gorman once said, “Anything but 
war is simulation.”  By generalizing some facets of a combat engagement (similar to 
                                                 
41 Jerome Braken, Moshe Kress, and Richard Rosenthal, Introduction to “Warfare Modeling,”  
Danvers, MA, 1995, p. 1. 
42 Paul Davis, “Aggregation, Disaggregation, and the 3:1 Rules in Ground Combat.”  Retrieved  
11 May 2006 from the World Wide Web at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/ 
MR638/Chap3.html. 
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Lanchester Equation applications), analysts concentrate on representing specific actions 
or characteristics in other areas in order to gain insights to assist decision makers. 
Some aspects of combat are easier to quantify and represent, such as the range of 
a weapon, the speed of a vehicle, the logistical demands of a unit, the protection afforded 
by terrain, equipment failure rates, etc.  Other aspects are intangible and much more 
difficult to quantify (and therefore represent).  Modeling individual characteristics and 
behaviors, such as leadership, experience, fatigue, fear, loyalty, aggression, and the 
complex, human decision-making process, is a challenge.  Obviously, these and countless 
other factors influence military conflicts.  One of many ways to describe the combat 
environment is asserted in Figure 4.  An even greater challenge is encountered in 
modeling the synergy joining the overlapping regions.  An example of such a synergy is 
the increased effectiveness of weapons fired by experienced and well-trained Soldiers, 
led by competent leaders.43 
 
The Combat Environment





















Figure 4.  The Combat Environment44 
 
                                                 
43 Pythagoras Manual, Version 1.9, p. 17.  Retrieved 12 May 2006 from the World Wide Web at 
http://sky.mhpcc.hawaii.edu:8080/r/Software/pythagoras/pyth19/pyth_19_manual.pdf. 
44 Ibid., p. 19. 
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Simulations typically leverage immense volumes of data to represent the 
attributes of the terrain military forces may fight on, the weather and light conditions that 
forces are subject to, the countless number of possible weapon-target pairings, and the 
attributes of weapon systems (including munitions and shooter characteristics), just to 
name a few.  Admittedly, no model can capture all the necessary data to represent all 
aspects of a military battle.  Yet, there is undeniable value in the potential insights the 
models can provide.  Even though accurately modeling combat may be an 
insurmountable task, mathematically representing certain aspects of combat is arguably 
achievable.  At a very basic level, it is as simple as agents (be they tanks, battalions, or 
Soldiers) maneuvering and firing on one another.  Data can be dynamically referenced to 
calculate a number of things—from movement rates and probabilities of detection to 
tracking logistics, to name just a few.  Although computational advancements have 
significantly increased the fidelity, resolution, and speed in DoD M&S, we must 
recognize serious shortcomings to modeling actual combat.  The skill of the analyst using 
the model is what produces useful insights.  This research attempts to capture 
assumptions and behaviors related to NLWs to gain insight on combat implications. 
B. MILITARY M&S NEEDS 
With the Soldier and small unit level of warfare being the centerpiece of  
Army Transformation goals and objectives,45 an Army-wide panel, the Soldier Modeling 
and Analysis Working Group (S-MAWG), was formed in 2003 and tasked to gain  
“full visibility of existing and planned model representations of battlefield phenomenon 
important to the conduct of analysis focused at the individual Soldier and small unit 
level.”46  The models evaluated by the S-MAWG were:  CASTFOREM, COMBAT XXI, 
JANUS, OneSAF, SSE, VIC, AWARS, CAEN, IUSS, AIMS, and JCATS (see  
List of Abbreviations, Acronyms and Symbols).  Through a series of evaluations, the  
S-MAWG identified deficiencies in current modeling capabilities that “must be addressed 
within models and simulations to enable credible analysis of the decision issues that are                                                  
45 United States Army, The Army, Field Manual 1, (Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 14 June 2005), p. 4-3.  Retrieved 12 May 2006 from the World Wide Web at 
http://www.army.mil/fm1/chapter2.html#section5. 
46 Larry Larimer and Pedro Habic, “Soldier Modeling and Analysis Working Group (MAWG) 
Evaluation Report,” TRADOC Analysis Center-White Sands Missile Range, NM, March 2004, Abstract. 
20 
especially pertinent to the individual Soldier and small unit.”47  One of the identified 
deficiencies was NLWs.  In fact, no model surveyed by the group explicitly portrayed the 
use and effects of NLWs. 
Other prominent organizations involved in modeling and supporting combat 
operations (down to the unit and Soldier level) have also recognized this deficiency.  The 
U.S. Army’s Urban Operations Focus Area Collaborative Team (UO FACT), whose 
purpose is to direct the Army’s modeling research pertaining to UO, identified modeling 
NLWs as an Army M&S priority and has recommended funding for research efforts in 
this area.48  The Army Materiel Analysis Activity (AMSAA) identified “non-lethal 
weapon performance as a significant analysis void for army acquisition and warfighting 
analysis.”49  The tri-service Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions 
Effectiveness (JTCG/ME) also identified the need for NLW performance estimates based 
on priority requests from Combatant Commands.  As such, the two organizations are 
working together on this high priority support to commanders in the field.50 
C. MODELING NLWs:  EMPLOYMENT CHALLENGES 
The first and perhaps the biggest challenge involved in modeling NLWs is to 
simply identify the appropriate targets for these types of weapons.  While it is asserted 
that non-lethal means are only reserved for noncombatants and lethal means for enemy 
combatants, modeling imperfect identification is a considerable challenge.  Traditional 
military M&S does not address this problem, typically only representing “red” and “blue” 
forces.  Although some early Army models do represent noncombatants (like JANUS), 
their role is notional at best.  One of the most impressive achievements of late is the 
ability of a combat model to represent multiple sides—i.e., beyond just red and blue 
forces (currently in COMBAT XXI and in the developing OneSAF Objective System).  
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Representing more than two sides may require a very dynamic set of rules and behaviors 
for interaction (see Table 1).  Although Side 2 may view Side 3 as neutral, the feelings 
are not reciprocal (Side 3 views Side 2 as hostile).  This common phenomenon occurs 
when multiple factions or ethic groups are in close (or even distant) proximity. 
 Side 1 Side 2 Side 3 Side 4 
Side 1 Friendly Friendly Hostile Friendly 
Side 2 Friendly Friendly Neutral Friendly 
Side 3 Hostile Hostile Friendly Neutral 
Side 4 Friendly Hostile Hostile Friendly 
Table 1.  Sides Relationship Example51 
Establishing relationships still does not solve the identification challenge.  
Consider a situation where a team assigned to Side 3 is moving through an unfamiliar 
urban environment at night and spots an individual approximately 50 meters ahead.  This 
individual could represent any one of the four possible sides.  What is the probability of 
successfully differentiating neutral from enemy (even friendly), especially if they are 
dressed (and sometimes even equipped/armed) the same way?  Depending on Side 3’s 
actions, outcomes range from no engagement (neutral) to incorrect engagement 
(incorrectly identified neutral as hostile), to being engaged (misidentified a hostile as a 
neutral and fired upon).  Mission success, a potential international incident, or mission 
failure could all be attributed to encounters such as these.  This very real problem is not 
well represented in current DoD M&S. 
Lastly, even if a simulation model does consider the identification challenge, 
current military models do not incorporate NLWs.  This is largely due to the nature of 
NLWs—they are still an immature technology and tactic for warfare.52  Current models 
do well at representing conventional weapons.  Conventional research and development 
of NLWs seeks to determine the probability of incapacitation.  This is fraught with a 
myriad of mitigating circumstances, from distance, to motivation, to size and musculature 
of the intended target.  Establishing probabilities of hit, accidental death, and even injury 
                                                 
51 John R. Surdu, Doug Parsons, and Oanh Tran, “OneSAF Objective System:  Modeling the Three 
Block War,” p. 3.  Retrieved 12 May 2006 from the World Wide Web at 
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52 Siniscalachi, p. 24. 
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are straightforward compared to modeling the reaction/behavior of an individual hit by an 
NLW.  An individual may wish to surrender, but may not know how.  The act of running 
or seeking cover may be construed as posturing for attack.  The challenge of proper 
interpretation or reading of the target’s reaction must be taken into account when 
attempting to model NLWs in combat operations. 
D. AGENT-BASED MODELING AND DATA FARMING 
As mentioned previously, the strengths of traditional military M&S lie in its 
ability to leverage tangible and quantifiable aspects of the environment (weather, terrain 
composition, elevation, etc.) and the agents (Soldiers, tanks, units, noncombatants) that 
interact within a specified scenario.  In order to address the challenges described above, it 
is necessary to enumerate human factors (individual characteristics and behaviors).  
Unfortunately, quantifying a Soldier’s motivation and level of caution is not something 
that can be easily measured.  Faced with these challenges, a nontraditional (nonmilitary 
specific) approach was used to explore the impact of NLWs in combat operations—
Agent-Based Simulations (ABS), also known as Multi-Agent Simulations (MAS).  ABS 
are not new to DoD analysts; these types of models have been used for years, only the 
terminology and a few aspects (such as representing knowledge and behavior) of ABS 
are new.53 
ABS are based on the idea of representing the behaviors of entities/agents and the 
possibility to “represent an emergent collective behavior that results from the interactions 
of an assembly of autonomous agents.”54  At a simplistic level, ABS are  
low-resolution models comprised of individual agents that interact according to states and 
rules of behavior.55  These agents may:  communicate with other agents; are driven by a 
set of tendencies or motivations; possess resources; are capable of perceiving their 
environment (sensors); possess skills; and behave with the intent of satisfying their  
                                                 
53 Thomas M. Cioppa and Thomas W. Lucas, “Military Applications of Agent-Based Simulations,” 
2004 Winter Simulation Conference, p. 2. 
54 Jacques Ferber, Multi-Agent Systems:  An Introduction to Distributed Artificial Intelligence,  
(Boston, MA:  Addison-Wesley, 1999), p. 35. 
55 Robert Axtell, “Why Agents?  On the Varied Motivations for Agent Computing in the Social 
Sciences,” Center on Social and Economic Dynamics, The Brookings Institute, 2000. 
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user-defined objectives.56  Within this construct, the very factors not considered in 
traditional DoD M&S will be quantified and serve as input to ABS. 
Unfortunately, the same difficulties of quantifying these human factor variables 
are still not solved (see Figure 3).  As mentioned previously, even if we could accurately 
approximate attribute values of our own forces, characterizing opposing, neutral, and 
cooperative forces is an even bigger challenge, with no guarantee of ever establishing the 
“correct” attribute value.  Therefore, it makes sense to incorporate a broad range of input 
variable levels to explore the corresponding consequences for better understanding.  
However, varying a multitude of input factors soon results in exponential growth of 
possible combinations.  This approach is impractical when applied to traditional DoD 
simulations characterized by time-intensive set-up and run-times. 
The scenario generation process for our high-resolution 
simulations is man-hour intensive and requires detailed knowledge of the 
simulation’s underlying data and operating assumptions.  Often times, the 
analyst is limited to a small set of simulation runs due to the simulation’s 
complexity, scenario development constraints, and the decision maker’s 
timeline.  Consequently, they may only obtain a limited view of  
possible outcomes.57 
In order to examine a greater range of possible inputs and circumstances, an 
exploratory analysis approach is needed.  Design-of-experiments (DOE) is an approach to 
handle the exponential growth of combinatorial factors.  Instead of using every possible 
combination of input variable levels, the DOE methodology used in this exploration is the 
Nearly-Orthogonal Latin-Hypercube (NOLH).  This approach efficiently explores the 
vast space of possible outcomes—commonly called the study space.  Using this efficient 
approach, it is not uncommon for these low resolution models to reduce the required time 
to complete all of the model runs (each run being a specific set or combination of factor 
levels) from billions of computing years to days of computing on a personal computer.58  
This computational time can then be significantly reduced by submitting the DOE (with 
                                                 
56 Ferber, p. 62. 
57 Lloyd Brown, Thomas Cioppa, and Thomas Lucas, “Agent-Based Simulations Supporting Military 
Analysis,” Phalanx, April 2004. 
58 Charles A. Sulewski, “An Exploration of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the Army’s Future Combat 
Systems Family of Systems,” Final Thesis and Conclusion Outbrief given to TRAC leaders and staff,  
5 December 2005. 
24 
accompanying scenario) to a bank of super-computers, such as those at the  
Maui High Performance Computing Center (MHPCC). 
ABS are uniquely qualified to tackle this formidable exploratory approach 
(otherwise known as data-farming) used to obtain insight on the study space.  ABS offer 
relatively quick scenario generation and incredibly fast run times.  By leveraging  
high-performance computing centers, analysts can consider many alternatives in a short 
amount of time.59  The insight gained from this exploratory approach can then be used as 
input for higher resolution military models, vastly saving time. 
E. PYTHAGORAS BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
Pythagoras, developed by Northrop Grumman in conjunction with Project Albert 
and the United States Marine Corps, was chosen as the ABS to support this research.  As 
with most ABS, Pythagoras is a low resolution model/simulation that is easy to learn, 
platform independent, and compatible for data farming.  Pythagoras’s color value 
methodology and “soft-decision” rules make it well suited to represent the attributes 
necessary to model NLWs.  Capabilities taken directly from the Pythagoras Manual60 are 
listed below (underlined text used to accentuate applicability to modeling NLWs): 
• Incorporates soft rules to distinguish unique agents 
• Uses desires to motivate agents into moving and shooting 
• Includes the concept of affiliation (established by sidedness, or color 
value) to differentiate agents into members of a unit, friendly agents, 
neutrals, or enemies 
• Allows for behavior-changing events and actions (called triggers) that may 
be invoked in response to simulation activities 
• Retains traditional weapons, sensors, and terrain 
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An overview of Pythagoras (to include behavior rules) is summarized below and 
taken either directly or indirectly from the Pythagoras Manual or from the  
simulation creators.61 
1. Pythagoras History and Overview 
In 1997, the U.S. Congress authorized a research project to evaluate 
nontraditional combat simulation modeling techniques that could potentially model three 
areas largely omitted from existing combat models: 
• Nonlinearity – Disproportionate effects of small input changes 
• Intangibles – Human factors such as leadership and others  
impact outcome 
• Coevolving Landscape – Adversaries anticipate actions and base 
decisions on their anticipation 
Project Albert, initially led by the Marine Corps, was conceived with these three 
objectives in mind.  Tasked with developing ABS to model human behavior and its effect 
on combat, Pythagoras enables users to create intelligent agents and assign behaviors 
based on motivators and detractors.  These agents use fuzzy-logic (soft rules) to capture 
the complex and dynamic nature of interacting with the environment and other agents 
(see Figure 3). 
2. Pythagoras Soft Rules 
Military orders are often ambiguous and mean different things to different people. 
An order to “hold fire until the enemy gets close” may mean six miles to a fighter pilot, 
but may mean six feet to embassy security.  Even if several people agree on a distance—
say, 400 feet—some will evaluate that distance a little long and be seen as trigger-happy, 
whereas others will evaluate it a little short and be seen as overcautious.  Fuzzy logic 
attempts to capture this complex, dynamic nature of interpretation, while creating a 
mathematical underpinning.  Soft decision rules assign each agent its own threshold to 
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reflect a variation of human factors between individual agents.  These rules also ensure 
traceability. 
This approach allows these agents desires and thresholds to be varied from 
replication (simulation run) to replication, and to be varied from agent to agent within a 
replicate.  Agents can adhere to their base values strictly or loosely (a mean value with an 
allowable range) within a replicate or use some combination of loose and strict 
adherence.  Depending on the level of adherence, either common behavior or highly 
individualistic behavior could emerge, from cohesive units with high training and 
discipline to single entities acting on their own. 
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IV. SOUTHWEST ASIA SCENARIO OVERVIEW 
A. VIGNETTE BACKGROUND 
In an attempt to share commonality with previously conducted FFW research 
(formerly Objective Force Warrior—OFW), the selected vignette was taken from the 
“Study Plan Supporting Analysis of the Objective Force Warrior – Night Attack in a 
Major Urban Area”.  This analysis, conducted from October 2004 through May 2005, 
used an internally developed simulation called Small Unit Team Exploratory Simulation 
(SUTES—see Appendix C for details). 
The vignette consists of a night urban operation in the Caspian Sea AO, 
specifically Azerbaijan (see Figure 5).  The SCU-sized mission is within the context of a 
larger mission to seize key sections of the capital city (Baku) held by Insurgents in order 
to assist the exiled and legitimate (host) government (see Appendix D:  Road to War and 
Appendix E:  Base Scenario Order).62 
 
  
Figure 5.  Overview of Vignette Location 
The SCU is tasked with moving through an urban area (Movement to Contact—
MTC) to seize and secure a building currently controlled by Insurgents.  An MTC is 
common to most military operations and is the focus of this research. 
                                                 
62 Annex C and Annex A of “The Study Plan Supporting Analysis of the  Objective Force Warrior – 
Night attack in a Major Urban Area,” prepared by the Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab,  
Fort Benning, GA, 23 June 2003. 
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B. FRIENDLY FORCES:  THE FFW 
1. Background 
The Army’s FFW Program is designed to make the Soldier and small unit more 
lethal and survivable on both the current and envisioned battlefield.63  FFW uses a system 
of systems approach to meet all projected Soldier needs through technology 
developments.  FFW is an Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) program and is 
. . . the Army’s flagship Science and Technology initiative to develop and 
demonstrate revolutionary capabilities for Future Force Soldier systems. . . 
FFW notional concepts seek to create a lightweight, overwhelmingly 
lethal, fully integrated individual combat system, including weapon,  
head-to-toe individual protection, netted communications, Soldier-worn 
power sources, and enhanced human performance.  The program is aimed 
at providing unsurpassed individual and squad lethality, survivability, 
communications, and responsiveness . . .64 
While FFW is a stand-alone program, it is designed to be integrated with the current force 
(Stryker) and the developing Future Combat Systems (FCS) combat and  
support platform.65 
2. Composition and Capabilities 
FFW is designed to be integrated into the existing structure of the infantry 
platoon.  The base organization for the FFW SCU consists of three rifle squads (each 
squad contains 2 teams of 4 men and a Squad Leader); a weapons squad (2 machine gun 
teams of 3, an antiarmor team of 2, and a Squad Leader); and a platoon headquarters  
(see Figure 6). 
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Figure 6.  FFW Platoon Organization with Potential Augmentations66 
Some of the FFW capability increases are highlighted below and further details of 
the program and equipment are shown in Appendix F. 
• Command and Control – Leaders have enhanced situational awareness 
(SA) of their Soldiers’ locations and health status of the platoon.  Near 
instantaneous transmission of information (voice/data/video) down to the 
individual Soldier level. 
• Survivability – The integrated battle ensemble provides improved 
ballistic and fragmentary protection.  The ensemble incorporates the load 
bearing ability into the ensemble, eliminating the need for separate load 
bearing equipment. 
• Lethality – Soldiers have access to NETFIRES (Netted Effects) with 
precision munitions (laser-guided or global positioning system (GPS)).  
                                                 
66 OFW MAPEX MOUT Vignette Description, Annex A (DRAFT), OFW ATD Integration Analysis 
and Simulation Team, p. 37. 
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Increased precision and lethality of the organic weapons.  Cooperative 
engagements maximize long-range lethality. 
• Mobility – Lighter weight equipment. 
• Survivability – Integrated battle ensemble with body armor and improved 
ballistic protection.  Integrated sensors and optics in helmet provide  
better SA. 
C. THREAT AND NONCOMBATANT DESCRIPTION 
Paralleling previous research, this vignette uses a dismounted group of enemy 
personnel characterized as Insurgents armed with Soviet-style weapons.  The legitimate 
government of Azerbaijan has been overthrown by the Azari Islamic Brotherhood 
(AIB—a coalition of antigovernment factions) and forced into exile.  The AIB has 
garrisoned small units (platoon and squad size) throughout the capital city (Baku) to 
secure key elements of power and control the populace.  The AIB are well trained, 
capably led, and are able to conduct operations day or night (limited night vision).67 
Perhaps the most difficult and realistic facet of this scenario is the difficulty  
U.S. forces will have discerning friend from foe.  Complicating the already challenging 
urban environment, enemy forces (Insurgents) do not wear a uniform and actively blend 
in with the local populace.  Unfortunately (and more challenging still), half of the locals 
are sympathetic to the Insurgents and may actually engage U.S. forces. 
D. CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION 
The FFW SCU will advance on two avenues of approach (two squads on one 
route, one squad on a parallel route) to the objective (OBJ BLUE), a media building 
currently controlled and used by the Insurgents (see Figure 7).  As the SCU travels under 
the cover of night toward the objective, it will encounter three types of 
individuals/groups:  Enemy Insurgents, Hostile Civilians, and Neutral Civilians.  
Unfortunately (and realistically), U.S. forces do not have perfect identification capability 
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and therefore can only characterize encounters in two ways:  (1) with identified 
Insurgents (either by hostile actions or armed/equipped); and (2) with individuals or 
groups not identified as Insurgents. 
 
Figure 7.  Pythagoras Scenario Representation 
The action taken in the first encounter is obvious for this vignette—open or return 
fire.  The action for the second encounter is more challenging and will depend on the 
distance to the individual(s).  Assuming that a sufficient Psy-Ops campaign predated this 
mission, the local populace should leave the AO when they identify U.S. forces 
conducting operations.  As such, when they are within the SCU’s “area of concern,” the 
SCU will employ NLWs to essentially “interrogate” the target.  This area of concern is 
part of the unit’s ROE and will be varied in this research from 25 to 50 meters.  The 
reactions of targeted individuals will determine the response—compliant/surrendered 
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V. MODELING METHODOLOGY 
A. BUILDING THE SCENARIO:  GETTING STARTED 
1. Collaboration and Disclaimer 
This research was a coordinated effort with U.S. Army graduate student  
Major Jon Alt’s thesis research titled “Exploring a Future Force Warrior Small Combat 
Unit Operating in an Urban Environment.”  A base case scenario was jointly developed 
in order to compare and synergize FFW research efforts.  This chapter is intended to 
introduce the reader to the Pythagoras modeling process and aspects specific to the 
scenario.  Further details are provided by the Pythagoras Manual (available upon request 
at http://www.projectalbert.org/downloads.html and in Appendix G. 
2. The Playbox 
According to the Pythagoras Manual, the first step to modeling a scenario is to 
define the pixel distance and time step.  The “playbox,” or area of interest, is represented 
in Pythagoras by a maximum of 1,000 by 1,000 pixels.  Scaling the terrain features of the 
vignette to the “playbox” with the accompanying time step is essential to bound and 
realistically represent interactions of agents with other agents, sensors, communication 
devices, and the terrain.  Once established, performance data such as movement rates, 
weapon ranges, and effective ranges of communications and sensor devices are scaled 
and represented in the model.  For this research, the area of interest has been modified at 
the request of the TRADOC Analysis Center in Monterey, California (TRAC-Monterey) 
to substitute the Baku, Azerbaijan AO (see Figure 5) used in the vignette with the 
McKenna MOUT (Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain) site at Ft. Benning, 




Figure 8.  Aerial Photo of McKenna MOUT Site, Ft. Benning, GA 
Tailoring the scenario to a known complex often used for training may provide 
benefits and lessons learned that may be incorporated into training for military units 
stationed stateside.  More importantly, it aids in comparative analysis.  MAJ Alt used 
commercial software (Microsoft Paint) to map the training area into Pythagoras from an 
aerial photo of the training area (see Figure 9) with accompanying urban sprawl. 
 
Figure 9.  Overhead Photograph of McKenna MOUT Site 
Using known distances/spacing of the McKenna MOUT site, a 3-to-1 ratio of 
pixels to meters was established.  The time step for the simulation was set to equal  
two seconds in order to trace specific combat actions in Pythagoras and approximate the 
time required to complete the mission in the vignette.  Attributes to characterize the cover 
and concealment as well as movement rates were then assigned to the features to 
approximate the affect of the terrain on the agents moving about in the  
urban environment. 
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B. THE EQUIPMENT AND PLAYERS 
With the terrain, scale, and time step established, the analyst then must represent 
the opposing (and neutral) sides.  In order to interact within the simulation, all agents in 
Pythagoras must be assigned at least one weapon, one communication device, and  
one sensor. 
1. Equipping the Forces 
The weapons and equipment for the FFW SCU and enemy forces are listed in 
Tables 2 and 3).  See Appendix H for equipment description and capabilities. 
Table 2.  Blue Forces Equipment List 
 
Agent Weapon #1 Weapon #2 Comms Sensor 
Insurgent Leader RPK-74 RPG Insurgent Radio Night Vision Device 
Insurgent Soldier AK-47 grenade None None 
Table 3.  Insurgent Equipment List 
The performance of the weapons and equipment used by the agents must be 
scaled to the playbox for a realistic representation.  See Appendix I for further details and 
performance scaling in Pythagoras. 
Agent Weapon #1 Weapon #2 Comm #1 Comm #2 Sensor 
Platoon Leader M4 grenade 
Soldier Radio 
Waveform 
Joint Tactical  
Radio System 
Fused Thermal  
and IR 
Platoon Sergeant M4 grenade 
Soldier Radio 
Waveform 
Joint Tactical  
Radio System 
Fused Thermal  
and IR 
Squad Leader M4 grenade 
Soldier Radio 
Waveform 
Joint Tactical  
Radio System 
Fused Thermal  
and IR 
Team Leader XM303 grenade 
Soldier Radio 
Waveform 
Joint Tactical  
Radio System 
Fused Thermal  
and IR 





Fused Thermal  
and IR 
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2. Assigning “Sidedness” 
In order to distinguish forces in Pythagoras, “sidedness” is assigned through the 
use of three colors: red, green, and blue.  The sidedness, or color values (0-255) of the 
three colors, allows agents to perceive/identify other agents as members of their own unit, 
friendly to the agent, neutral to the agent, or hostile to the agent.  The process of 
assigning color values can be a very complicated one, especially when there are more 
than two sides and the relationships between sides differ from each side’s perspective 
(see Table 1 – Sides Relationship Example). 
For illustrative purposes, the “blueness” of an agent can be selected to represent 
the allegiance of an agent.  If an agent has a blueness (blue value) equal or very close to 
another agent’s blueness, it can represent being in the same unit (in our case, a team).  A 
slightly larger difference in values can represent a friendly relationship (such as within a 
platoon or company).  Larger differences in blue values can represent enemy 
relationships.  Neutral relationships exist between the predetermined friendly and enemy 
distance limitations (or “Color Radius”).  Other agents do not necessarily have to use the 
same rule set or colors to determine relationships.  In this way, multiple sides may be 
represented in the model.  Figure 10 illustrates the assignment of color values to each 
agent and the Color Radius sets the tolerance (differences in color values) associated with 
different relationships (Unit, Friendly, or Enemy).  The resulting relationships are seen in 
Figure 11. 
 
Figure 10.  Pythagoras Sidedness Worksheet – Value Assignment 
 
Figure 11.  Pythagoras Sidedness Worksheet – Resulting Relationships 
In this example, U.S. forces define unit relationships using blue (represented as a 
“1” in the binary “Use Blue” column).  Because the 1st Squad Riflemen have the same 
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blue value as the 1st Squad Team Leader (230, as shown in Figure 10), the blueness 
difference is less than radius (of 1) and therefore falls under the Unit category.  This 
relationship is confirmed in the Resulting Relationships Worksheet (Figure 11).  Because 
the difference is also less than the Friend radius of 11, it is also identified as Friend.  The 
difference for the Riflemen from the 2nd Squad is 10 and therefore falls under the Friend 
category, but not the Unit category.  For an enemy relationship, the difference between 
values has to be greater that the unit radius value.  Because the Enemy Color Radius 
(131) is less than the difference between each of the blue agents’ colors, and the 
Insurgent’s blue value is 50 (a difference of 180), the resulting relationship is Enemy.  
Neutral relationships are indicated by an absence of a relationship.  This dynamic 
functionality also allows the analyst to account for imperfect identification. 
C. BEHAVIORS 
1. Movement Desires and Terrain Preferences 
With the terrain and agents now represented in Pythagoras, the actions comprising 
the vignette are tailored into Pythagoras in a number of ways.  Generally, agents travel by 
assigned waypoints.  Rules and tendencies affect how agents travel to the next waypoint.  
Two factors that affect the path are the agent’s movement desires and its terrain 
preferences.  Movement desires allow the user to simulate unit cohesion and tactics by 
manipulating the agents’ desire to move toward or away from other agents (unit, friendly, 
and enemy).  Terrain preferences likewise guide an agent in route selection by avoiding 
“bad” terrain and preferring “good” terrain (user defined). 
2. Generalized Agent Behaviors 
The following descriptions apply to the behaviors of the agents within the 
vignette/simulation: 
• U.S. Forces:  Move along two avenues of approach (streets) directly to the 
objective, OBJ BLUE.  The SCU will move as fire teams (using tactical 
spacing) along the building to avoid being engaged in the middle of the 
streets.  The SCU will not pursue targets, but will purposely continue to 
the objective to support future integrated tactics.  The SCU engage with 
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lethal means only those perceived to be enemy; personnel perceived as 
neutral will be engaged with an NLW if they are inside the weapon range. 
• Insurgents:  Four teams of Insurgents patrol the area and will 
aggressively pursue and attack U.S. forces when detected.  Insurgents will 
fight to the death. 
• Hostile Civilians:  Randomly move about the scenario (but favor the 
streets).  They will not always be perceived as hostile.  When they detect 
U.S. forces, they will wait a random amount of time before engaging.  
Once they engage U.S. forces, they will be clearly identified as enemy. 
• Civilians:  Randomly move about the scenario, but will avoid groups of 
U.S. forces.  If engaged with lethal means, surrounding Civilians 
(including Hostile) will attack. 
• Suicide Bomber:  Once he detects a group of U.S. Soldiers, he will try to 
get within 10 feet of them before detonating his bomb. 
3. Behavior Triggers 
Triggers are events in the simulation that cause an agent to change its behavior.  
Examples of triggers include being shot at, detecting an enemy or friend, the passing of 
an amount of time, reaching an objective, or even a change in color(s).  This dynamic 
functionality allows the user to program chained triggers to represent complex 
interactions and reactions (like tactics and decision-making). 
D. REPRESENTING NLWs IN PYTHAGORAS 
Pythagoras uses the term “weapon” to describe an influence tool.  As such, it can 
represent the damaging effects of conventional weapons or even the healing or restorative 
powers of medicine and food.  Alternatively, it can also represent intangible effects such 
as fear, hunger, pain, or encouragement.  Instead of bullets or bombs, the “intangible 
effects” weapons essentially shoot color at the targets.  When an agent is hit by this 
“painting” weapon, it may change its color values.  When triggers are programmed to 
corresponding changes in color values, behaviors can be modeled.  In this way, agents 
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involved in a humanitarian relief effort can “feed” starving people; a loudspeaker weapon 
can spur aggression; or an NLW can influence a target to surrender. 
In this scenario, if an NLW hits a target, it “paints” (adding or subtracting color) a 
designated amount of color(s) to the agent.  When a threshold value is reached, a 
programmed trigger changes the agent’s behavior, perhaps causing actions characterized 
as surrendering.  The probability of an agent surrendering depends on its assigned 
vulnerability to color changes.  By tailoring these vulnerabilities and the amount of color 
painted to an agent, different probabilities of surrender can be assigned to different agents 
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VI. THE EXPERIMENT 
A. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOEs) 
 In order to determine the impact of equipping the FFW SCU with NLWs, some 
MOEs must be selected to describe and compare the output results of the experiment.  
Just as the score of a sporting event describes the outcome of a game (or match, event, 
etc.), combat operations typically use kills or attrition to gauge success and failure.  The 
MOEs for this research address the very basic measures of warfare:  lethality and 
survivability.  These two MOEs were also the most important MOEs of previous FFW 
research.  Preliminary analysis of hundreds of tailored scenario runs consistently yielded 
no Insurgent survivors and therefore resulted in eliminating lethality from MOE 
consideration.  Since survivability also (although not traditionally) applies to 
noncombatants, unintended casualties (either from lethal or non-lethal munitions) and 
surrendered personnel will also be accounted for with MOEs.  A third MOE was used to 
capture the very real risk of a Suicide Bomber attacking the unit.  This attack is modeled 
to be without an explosive payload in order to simplify analysis (i.e., it does not degrade 
U.S. force’s survivability statistics). 
MOE 1:  Survivability – Percentage of Friendly (Blue) Noncasualties 
MOE 2:  Collateral Damage – Percentage of Civilian Casualties 
MOE 3:  Suicide Bomber’s Success – Percentage of Successful Suicide Attacks 
B. PRIMARY DESIGN FACTORS 
The primary objective of this research effort is to determine the combat 
implications of employing an NLW.  This is essentially a binary variable—collecting 
model MOEs with and without NLWs.  In this experiment, an NLW range of 0 meters 
represents the base case—a Soldier does not possess an NLW (only lethal) and must rely 
on physically restraining an individual.  The range will then be changed to 25 meters (the 
FFW capability requirement) and subjected to the same conditions.  The collected MOEs 
will be the basis of comparison.  Exploration also includes the effects of increasing the 
number of NLWs available to the unit as well as an extended range capability to 
determine if more of either (or both) is better and, if so, how much better. 
42 
• NLW Range:  0 meters, 25 meters, 50 meters 
• NLW Distribution:  6 per SCU, 12 per SCU 
Because the employment of NLWs in combat operations is intimately linked to 
imperfect identification, three levels of identification will be explored for both cases 
(with and without NLWs).  This is used to approximate the difficulty of discerning friend 
from foe in combat.  It can represent the skill of the Insurgents to blend into the local 
population or the targeting ability of experienced Soldiers familiar with the opposing 
forces.  A practical example of this phenomenon is recognizing the footwear of 
Insurgents in a crowd—running shoes rather than typical/regional sandals to expedite 
departure upon discovery.68  These levels attempt to capture the probability of shooting 
the opposing forces versus a noncombatant in the wrong place at the wrong time  
(see Appendix G for implementation details): 
• Most Dangerous/Risky – Characterized by more restrictive engagement 
criteria due to difficulty associated with identifying Insurgents.   
U.S. forces will be able to positively identify Insurgents only 20% of the 
time; 15% for Hostile Civilians.  This means the Insurgents (and  
Hostile Civilians) typically get to shoot first.  Civilians will be mistaken as 
the enemy 10% of the time. 
• Least Dangerous/Risky (Best Case) – Characterized by an easier ability 
to separate the Insurgents from the Civilians.  U.S. forces will be able to 
positively identify an Insurgent 80% of the time and 70% for  
Hostile Civilians; Civilians will be mistaken as the enemy only 5% of  
the time. 
• Most Likely Case – A 50% chance of identifying an Insurgent correctly; 
57% chance of identifying Hostile Civilian correctly; Civilians will be 
mistaken as the enemy 8% of the time. 
                                                 
68 Phone interview between U.S. Air Force Major William Pramenko, Chief of Health Effects Branch, 
Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate and the author, May 2006. 
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C. SECONDARY DESIGN FACTORS 
As previously mentioned, accurately characterizing behaviors, performance, and 
tactics is a considerable challenge with no guarantee of accuracy.  Therefore, it makes 
sense to incorporate a broad range of input variable levels to explore the corresponding 
consequences to the MOEs.  These input variables are often not controllable by  
decision makers and are often referred to in the military community as “the enemy has a 
vote.”   This means that the location, composition, tactics, or capabilities may be different 
than expected and undoubtedly requires further experimentation to explore “what-if” 
scenarios (often referred to as branches and sequels).  A thorough (or robust) DOE 
accounts for these controllable and uncontrollable factors (synonymous to noise factors) 
and arguably reflects real (or potentially real) circumstances.  The NOLH DOE allows 
the analyst to analyze and estimate multiple effects, interactions, and thresholds by 
efficiently varying a multitude of variables.69 
Secondary factors with accompanying levels are listed in Table 4.  Qualitative 
descriptions of levels are used to describe behavioral responses (a scaled score) or 
distance to initial location (within a prescribed perimeter) for the agents.  Any number of 
levels may be explored between the low and high values. 
Factor Variable Range Explanation 
Number of Insurgents 8 – 40  The number of Insurgents in the scenario 
Number of Civilians 3 – 30  The number of Civilians in the scenario 
Number of Hostile Civilians 3 – 30 The number of Hostile Civilians in the scenario 
Civilian Surrender Resistance Low – High Effectiveness of NLWs on Civilians 
Hostile Surrender Resistance Low – High Effectiveness of NLWs on Hostile Civilians 
Insurgent Surrender Resistance Low – High Effectiveness of NLWs on Civilians 
Civilian Proximity Low – High How close Civilians will approach U.S. Forces 
Animosity of Hostile Civilians Low – High Probability of attacking U.S. forces 
Location of Insurgents Random Distribution Initial start point of Insurgent Patrols 
Location of Civilians Random Distribution Initial start point of Civilians 
Location of Hostile Civilians Random Distribution Initial start point of Hostile Civilians 
Table 4.  Uncontrollable Factors and Levels 
                                                 
69 Thomas M. Cioppa, “Efficient Nearly Orthogonal and Space-Filling Experimental Designs for  
High-Dimensional Complex Models,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Operations Research Department,  
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2002. 
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D. SCOPING CONSIDERATIONS 
As mentioned previously, this research effort was closely coordinated with  
MAJ Jon Alt to explore FFW SCU operations in an urban environment.  Extensive efforts 
were spent attempting to accurately represent current and future technologies and 
external enabler capabilities to establish a base case for both research efforts. With the 
base case established, different methodologies and directions were pursued to investigate 
our respective research questions.  In order to isolate the (potential) effect of NLWs, 
many aspects of the scenario were intentionally simplified and/or not modeled for  
several reasons. 
1. “Walk, Crawl, Run” 
This represents a philosophy used by the Army for training and implies the 
obvious—build up fundamental (and usually easier) skills before attempting more 
difficult tasks.  Beginner-, intermediate-, and advanced-level progression applies to real 
life and to M&S—especially when addressing uncharted/novel solutions.  A proposed 
solution must first pass simplistic and conceptual tests before subjecting it to more 
complicated conditions and situations.  This research reflects a novel application of 
NLWs in combat and therefore exploration must start with (overly) simplified conditions. 
One of the biggest challenges in this research and on the battlefield is target 
discrimination.  Proposing a framework to handle varying levels of identification 
(“Sidedness” in Pythagoras) is tested in conjunction with the employment of a new type 
of combat weapon (NLW with accompanied tactic proposed in Chapter II).  This 
initiative alone quickly exceeds a beginner’s level and therefore necessitates testing in 
very simplistic combat conditions before asymmetric and synergistic military tactics and 
capabilities are addressed. 
2. Simplifying Combat 
There is inherent danger associated with attempting to model too much: the more 
one tries to imitate reality, the more uncertainty is introduced into the model.  For 
illustrative purposes, if it is desired to determine if it is advantageous to substitute a more 
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accurate, but slower (rate of fire) direct fire weapon for small unit operations, it does not 
make sense to vary (or perhaps even represent) the effects of indirect fires.  While it may 
be useful in a general sense, it is more difficult to attribute the changes in MOE levels to 
the weapon in question.  Attempting to represent these types of aspects subjects the 
model to more scrutiny (variance).  As such, indirect fires are not represented in the 
simulation.  This decision is supported by the assertion that the use of indirect assets in a 
populated urban environment is not desirable.  Also, if opposing sides have similar or 
offsetting capabilities, there is no utility in explicitly modeling if proportional MOEs  
are used. 
Another reason to simplify combat is to address more general or more difficult 
conditions.  Assets or support may not be available for a particular small unit tasked to 
move through an urban environment (occupied with enemy and noncombatants).  Lastly, 
the contributions of current and anticipated improvements (equipment, robotics, sensors, 
etc.) for the FFW SCU (to include external enablers) are unproven in the laboratory or on 
the battlefield.  As such, the following assumptions and scoping considerations were 
made for this research: 
1. Ground Robotics – Small Unmanned Ground Vehicles (SUGVs) and  
Armed Robotic Vehicles (ARVs) are anticipated to be an integral part of the FFW SCU.  
These assets are unproven and may not be available/operational to all SCUs. 
2. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) – The exact variant, number, and 
performance of the UAV to be used for the FFW SCU is still being 
investigated/researched.  This technology/capability is a tremendous asset, but suspect at 
differentiating the enemy from noncombatants.  The SA gained by these assets more than 
likely level the playing field against forces operating on their own familiar terrain.  As 
such, one may argue that situational awareness is roughly equal for the forces and 
therefore need not be modeled. 
3. XM104 Cooperative Engagement – A fire control device mounted on the 
future grenadier’s weapon.70  The fire control device receives the coordinates and target 
                                                 
70 TRADOC System Manager-Soldier (TSM-S), “Capability Development Document for Ground 
Soldier System:  ACAT I,” 13 June 2005, pp. 57-58. 
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description over the SCU network.  This unproven capability is potentially risky to 
employ while moving through an urban environment occupied with noncombatants. 
4. Reduced Exposure Fire – The Soldier’s sight picture is transmitted to a 
remote display, thereby reducing head and shoulder exposure during engagements.  Its 
capability is unproven.71 
5. Mortars/Artillery – Not modeled for reasons given above. 
E. DATA SOURCES AND MODEL ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Perfect Friendly Identification – Through the use of the FFW communication 
network, communication and Blue Force Tracking (BFT) is assumed to yield perfect 
friendly location/identification.  Although ambitious and optimistic, friendly fires are not 
considered in this research, but potentially strengthen the need for NLWs. 
2. Perfect Communication – Through the use of the FFW, communication and 
coordination for tactics and movements are assumed to be perfect. 
3. Movement Rates and Techniques – Assumed to be representative of an 
SCU’s movement through an urban area.  Increased sensors, communication, and armor 
do not inhibit movement rates. 
4. Simplified Engagements – Weapon ranges are limited to 200 meters for 
practicality (urban environment at night); multiple targets are randomly prioritized; 
coordinated fire involves no more than a squad (9 personnel). 
5. Performance Data Accuracy – Performance data for weapons, sensors, and 
equipment were collected from AMSAA and are assumed to be accurate. 
6. Civilian and Hostile Civilian Modeling – No effort was made to represent all 
possible civilians in the vignette; only a designated number for exploratory purposes. 
F. PYTHAGORAS LIMITATIONS AND SHORTCOMINGS 
Throughout the conduct of this research, several students using the Pythagoras 
model discovered bugs and shortcomings in version 1.8.  As such, Northrop Grumman 
                                                 
71 TRADOC System Manager-Soldier (TSM-S), “Capability Development Document for Ground 
Soldier System:  ACAT I,” 13 June 2005, p. 4. 
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provided fixes and new version releases:  1.9, 1.9.1, and 1.9.2, and 1.10 (Beta).  While 
each new version fixed known problems/shortcomings and provided more capabilities, 
additional bugs and shortcomings were subsequently discovered.  Unfortunately, support 
and data farming were no longer available for previous versions after version 1.10 (Beta) 
was released. 
Deficiencies in behavior triggers, knowledge retention, and data collection 
methods led Northrop Grumman to tailor a fix specific to this research effort.  
Unfortunately, this custom version is not able to leverage the data farming tools of 
Project Albert.  This deficiency is expected to be resolved with the anticipated June 2006 
1.10 final version release.  Consequently, only the primary design factors could be 
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VII. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. DATA COLLECTION AND POST PROCESSING 
 Without the ability to leverage data farming techniques (using a NOLH design), 
the primary design factors were manually varied and run in the batch mode of 
Pythagoras.  This corresponds to traditional M&S analysis methods.  Some of the 
secondary design factors are accounted for by leveraging the tolerance functionality in 
Pythagoras.  Variations in starting locations, movement desires, hostility appearance (for 
identification purposes), and resistance (to surrender) allow for a more robust design and 
broader analysis (rather than indicating that all analysis is only warranted for very  
exact conditions). 
 Each of the 15 design points (different scenario conditions, see Table 5) were 
replicated 10 times (with the same starting and subsequent random seeds for each design 
point), yielding a total of 150 output files.  Each of these output files were converted 
(renamed) to comma separated value (.csv) files, consolidated by design point, and 









1 Team Leaders (6) High No NLW 
2 Team Leaders (6) High 25 Meters 
3 Team Leaders (6) High 50 Meters 
4 Team Leaders (6) Mid No NLW 
5 Team Leaders (6) Mid 25 Meters 
6 Team Leaders (6) Mid 50 Meters 
7 Team Leaders (6) Low No NLW 
8 Team Leaders (6) Low 25 Meters 
9 Team Leaders (6) Low 50 Meters 
10 All Leaders (12) High 25 Meters 
11 All Leaders (12) High 50 Meters 
12 All Leaders (12) Mid 25 Meters 
13 All Leaders (12) Mid 50 Meters 
14 All Leaders (12) Low 25 Meters 
15 All Leaders (12) Low 50 Meters 
Table 5.  Design Points 
B. INITIAL INSIGHTS 
When comparing the Blue (U.S.) Survivability scores in Table 6, increasing either 
the range or distribution (number) of NLWs results in slightly higher Blue Survivability 
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scores.  It seems that being able to interrogate a potential enemy with NLWs offsets the 
risk of allowing an unconfirmed enemy to engage first.  Although the enemy may then 
return with lethal fire, there may be several reasons why Blue Survivability generally 
does not suffer:  the speed at which Blue forces immediately engage with lethal means; 
superior protection offered by FFW body armor; and/or because typical Insurgent forces 
are at a disadvantage engaging U.S. forces at nighttime, as the U.S. military “owns” the 
night (with its superior sensors and targeting devices). 
NLW Range Blue Survivability 
No Range 0.63 
25 Meters 0.66 
50 Meters 0.66 
Table 6.  Blue Survivability Based on Range and Distribution 
Not only does this logic apply to the enemy, it also applies (even more so) to 
Hostile Civilians.  The ability to interrogate Hostile Civilians (forcing surrender or 
subsequent lethal engagement) generally offsets the increased risk of them engaging at a 
later time (modeled to attack at a random time).  A Hostile Civilian who 
complies/surrenders may recognize that their life has been spared (because we used an 
alternative to deadly force).  Moreover, their friends and family may also recognize this.  
Thus, employing NLWs has the potential to diffuse/lessen hostility toward U.S. forces 
rather than fueling the anger of the local populace had the targeted individual been 
engaged with lethal means. 
An analysis of Civilian Survivability in Table 7 yields similar results.  Increased 
NLW capabilities lead to marginally better Civilian Survivability scores.  This may be 
attributed to the ability to identify a threat from a nonthreat—more precisely, the 
consequences of mistakes.  Civilians may be (unfortunately) mistaken as an enemy, 
depending on their movement and possessions.  Soldiers have different probabilities of 
correctly identifying them as neutral rather than enemy.  When a Blue Force Soldier 
engages someone with an NLW, it potentially “saves” that individual from being 
mistaken as an enemy by another Soldier (and subsequently engaged with lethal means).  
While that may not always be the case, an NLW offsets this risk. 
NLW Distribution Blue Survivability 
Team Leaders 0.65 






Table 7.  Civilian Survivability Based on Range and Distribution 
A similar analysis of Suicide Bomber Success Rate yields predictable results  
(see Table 8).  Increased NLW capabilities lead to greatly reduced Suicide Bomber 
Success Rates.  Averaged throughout the entire experiment, one Suicide Bomber has a 
50% chance of being perceived as a threat (as reflected in the no NLW statistic).  Just 
having the ability to interrogate such an individual dramatically reduces their chance of 
success.  It is interesting to note that doubling the number of NLWs distributed to the 






Table 8.  Suicide Bomber Success Based on NLW Range and Distribution 
Before determining the significance of these statistics, it is worth mentioning that 
these results are important in verifying the framework of the model—consistent and 
arguably intuitive.  This in itself is a significant accomplishment.  While this research is 
exploratory, this identification framework can be applied to existing or future scenarios to 
better approximate UO, with or without NLWs.  This framework can also be used to 
compare alternative NLWs, especially if input data (surrender probabilities, 
misidentification rates, hostility) are more precisely approximated. 
C. A CLOSER LOOK 
In order to obtain more insight on the combinatorial effects of NLW range and 
distribution on all three MOEs, the ten replications at each design points were 
consolidated and examined within each Misidentification Level (see Table 9).  Because 
Blue Survivability is historically the most important combat MOE, the design points are 
ranked within each Misidentification Level in descending Blue Survivability order (top is 
best).  Bold numbers represent the highest scores within each Misidentification Level. 
NLW Range Civilian Survivability 
No Range  0.86 
25 Meters 0.88 





Team Leaders 0.86 
All Leaders 0.89 
NLW  
Range 
Suicide Bomber  
Success Rate 
No NLW 0.50 
25 Meters 0.05 
50 Meters 0.00 
NLW 
Distribution 
Suicide Bomber  
Success Rate 
Team Leaders 0.033 
















Low All Leaders 50 Meters 0.0 0.913 0.790 
Low All Leaders 25 Meters 0.0 0.963 0.777 
Low Team Leaders 50 Meters 0.0 0.963 0.749 
Low Team Leaders 25 Meters 0.0 0.925 0.733 
Low Team Leaders No NLW 0.1 0.988 0.731 
Mid All Leaders 25 Meters 0.0 0.838 0.690 
Mid Team Leaders 50 Meters 0.0 0.813 0.690 
Mid All Leaders 50 Meters 0.0 0.838 0.659 
Mid Team Leaders 25 Meters 0.0 0.800 0.659 
Mid Team Leaders No NLW 0.6 0.725 0.641 
High All Leaders 50 Meters 0.0 0.890 0.569 
High Team Leaders 25 Meters 0.2 0.850 0.567 
High All Leaders 25 Meters 0.1 0.888 0.564 
High Team Leaders No NLW 0.8 0.863 0.531 
High Team Leaders 50 Meters 0.0 0.838 0.518 
Table 9.  Effect of NLW Capabilities at Each Misidentification Level 
Intuitively, one would think the increased NLW range and distribution  
(All Leaders and 50 Meters—these rows are shaded above) would consistently yield the 
most favorable results for all three MOEs.  This only occurs within the  
High Misidentification Level.  Of course, this is the most demanding and dangerous 
level.  That same combination actually yields the worst Civilian Survivability score 
within the Low Misidentification Level.  Strangely, at the low level, the base case  
(Team Leaders and No NLW) actually has the highest Civilian Survivability score. 
Other anomalies occur within the High Misidentification Level—the base case 
(Team Leaders with No NLW) has better Blue and Civilian Survivability scores than 
Team Leaders with the extended NLW range (50 meters) and a better  
Civilian Survivability score than Team Leaders with the 25-meter NLW range.  Since 
there is no clear combination of NLW capabilities that yield the best results across all 
MOEs regardless of Misidentification Level, an aggregated score is used.  An overall CE 
score is calculated using weighted MOEs. 
D. SCORING THE EXPERIMENTS:  RESPONSE FUNCTION 
CALCULATIONS 
In order to evaluate and compare the contribution of NLWs at each design point, a 












Weight 0.5 0.3 0.2 
Table 10.  MOE Weightings for CE Score 
This weighting reflects a professional judgment and is not approved by the  
FFW program.  Although the success of a Suicide Bomber can considerably affect the 
survivability of the U.S. forces, this research does not address explosive payload or the 
consequences of such a potential threat in an attempt to isolate NLW effects.  The 
following equation is therefore used to calculate CE: 
CE = (U.S. Surv)*(0.5) + (Civilian Surv)*(0.3) − (Suicide Success Rate)*(0.2) 
This equation also does not account for Hostile Civilians (lethality, survivability, 
or surrendered).  Addressing the contributions and effects of these players may be a 
significant factor to be explored with future research. 
E. DO NLWs CONTRIBUTE TO HIGHER CE SCORES? 
In order to determine the most dominant factor for determining CE (from the 
three primary factors:  NLW Range, NLW Distribution, or Misidentification Rate), batch 
runs at each design point were aggregated and investigated.  A tree diagram  
(see Figure 12) and box plots (see Figure 13) confirm that Misidentification Level is the 
biggest and clearest factor driving CE scores.  This means that the success of  
U.S. military forces (in this scenario and simulation) largely depend on how well we can 
differentiate friend from foe.  This logic supports heavily leveraging technology to 
maintain and push our advantage in the realm of sensors/vision devices (e.g., thermal, IR, 
etc.), especially in conditions of limited visibility.  It also confirms the importance of 
actually addressing this issue in combat (and combat analysis).  This is especially 
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Figure 12.  Tree Diagram of Most Relevant Factor for CE 
The tree diagram above depicts the significance of the Misidentification Level in 
determining the CE score.  Not only does it represent the greatest difference between the 
highest CE scores and the rest of the design points, it also is the second biggest factor in 
differentiating CE scores (the lowest scores from the rest, or middle).  The contributions 
of NLW distribution and range to CE score clearly play a less important role compared to 
the Misidentification Level.  This conclusion comes as no surprise, as our success 
depends on how well we can target differentiate the enemy, especially when the enemy 
has no problem identifying U.S. forces (we are in uniform). 
The boxplots (which depict the means and quartiles of scores and the means) in 
Figure 13 support this assertion.  The boxplot of the CE score by Misidentification Level 
clearly separate CE scores.  If a few extreme outliers were not included in our 
consideration there would be very little overlap.  The other boxplots (by primary factor) 
have significant overlap.  While it would be fairly simple to categorize the 
Misidentification Level by a CE score or even predict the CE score at a given 
Misidentification Level, it would not be so easy with the NLW distribution or range 
boxplots.  The means of the NLW distribution are very close to the same score, as are the 
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Long Range Mid Range No RangeBase Ldr
 
 One-Way Analysis of CE  
By Misidentification Level By NLW Distribution By NLW Range 
 
Figure 13.  Box Plots of Primary 




logically applies to different 
scenarios altogether (describes 
the enemy, urban 
composition/attitude, visibility 
conditions, and ability to differentiate targets).  When these levels/scenarios were 






Range CE Mean Score 
All Leaders (12) High 50 Meters 5.55 
All Leaders (12) High 25 Meters 5.28 
Team Leaders (6) High 50 Meters 5.10 
Team Leaders (6) High 25 Meters 4.98 
Team Leaders (6) High No NLW 3.64 
      
All Leaders (12) Low 25 Meters 6.77 
All Leaders (12) Low 50 Meters 6.69 
Team Leaders (6) Low 50 Meters 6.63 
Team Leaders (6) Low 25 Meters 6.44 
Team Leaders (6) Low No NLW 6.42 
      
All Leaders (12) Mid 25 Meters 5.96 
Team Leaders (6) Mid 50 Meters 5.89 
All Leaders (12) Mid 50 Meters 5.81 
Team Leaders (6) Mid 25 Meters 5.69 
Team Leaders (6) Mid No NLW 4.18 
Table 11.  Ranked CE Scores by Misidentification Rate 
While the exact combination of NLW distribution and range may still be 
debatable, there is no question that any NLW capability is better than none—the lowest 
CE score at each level comes from an SCU without an NLW.  It is interesting to note that 
a larger distribution of NLWs appears to be more important than an extended range 
capability (All Leaders equipped with NLWs yielded the highest CE scores in all three 



















By fitting a regression model to the data, the amount of the contribution of each 
factor to the CE score can be quantified.  In order to do a full factorial regression, three 
additional design points were created and replicated (All Leader, No NLW, and 
High/Mid/Low Misidentification Levels, 10 times each).  Although these design points 
are actually the same as the base (Team Leader) cases, it allows the regression model to 
maintain degrees of freedom when calculating interactions.  While the overall regression 
model only accounts for 0.581 of the variance of the model (as seen by R2 = 0.581; the 
closer this value is to 1.0, the better the model), the Whole Model Actual versus  
Predicted Plot certainly captures a trend (see Figure 14).  It is important to note that this 
regression model is unable to account for the secondary factors that were varied with the 









Figure 14.  Regression Analysis:  Whole Model Plot and Summary of Fit 
When the final version of Pythagoras 1.10 is released, the ability to data farm and 
therefore capture unaccounted (and uncollected/recorded) model variations (such as 
vulnerability, hostility, and movement desires) will most certainly yield a better 
predictive model.  Additionally, the ability to use the MHPCC will yield several thousand 
replications (rather than just 10) to better shield the model from extreme outliers. 
By looking at the Parameter Estimates of the regression model in Table 12, 
significant factors become readily apparent by examining the far right column (Prob>|t|).  
Any value less than 0.05 indicates that the factor has a statistically significant 
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.581
RSquare Adj 0.537
Root Mean Square Error 0.865
Mean of Response 5.474
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Score Predicted P<.0001 RSq=0.58
RMSE=0.8648
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contribution, either positively or negatively, to the CE score.  The amount of the 
contribution is found within the Estimate column. 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Intercept 5.4740773 0.064456 84.93 <.0001
NLW Possession[Base] –0.032216 0.064456 –0.50 0.6179
MisId Level[High] –0.761859 0.091154 –8.36 <.0001
MisId Level[Low] 0.930005 0.091154 10.20 <.0001
NLW Possession[Base]*MisId Level[High] –0.104385 0.091154 –1.15 0.2538
NLW Possession[Base]*MisId Level[Low] 0.1244172 0.091154 1.36 0.1742
NLW Range[Long Range] 0.4691227 0.091154 5.15 <.0001
NLW Range[Mid Range] 0.3818977 0.091154 4.19 <.0001
NLW Possession[Base]*NLW Range[Long Range] –0.037834 0.091154 –0.42 0.6787
NLW Possession[Base]*NLW Range[Mid Range] –0.117225 0.091154 –1.29 0.2003
MisId Level[High]*NLW Range[Long Range] 0.1428593 0.128911 1.11 0.2694
MisId Level[High]*NLW Range[Mid Range] 0.0390093 0.128911 0.30 0.7626
MisId Level[Low]*NLW Range[Long Range] –0.214555 0.128911 –1.66 0.0980
MisId Level[Low]*NLW Range[Mid Range] –0.17913 0.128911 –1.39 0.1666
NLW Possession[Base]*MisId Level[High]*NLW Range[Long Range] –0.047515 0.128911 –0.37 0.7129
NLW Possession[Base]*MisId Level[High]*NLW Range[Mid Range] 0.1039518 0.128911 0.81 0.4212
NLW Possession[Base]*MisId Level[Low]*NLW Range[Long Range] –0.081967 0.128911 –0.64 0.5258
NLW Possession[Base]*MisId Level[Low]*NLW Range[Mid Range] –0.140276 0.128911 –1.09 0.2781
Table 12.  Fitted Regression Model Parameter Estimates (with Significant Factors bolded) 
These model parameters indicate that the Misidentification Levels and  
NLW Range are the only factors that can be confidently attributed to the CE score across 
all design points, as evident by the Prob>|t| values of “<.0001.”  A high Misidentification 
Level will decrease the CE score (as indicated by a negative estimate value of –0.76).  
Surprisingly, increasing NLW distribution fails to have a significant effect on increasing 
CE, almost contrary to observations.  A low Misidentification Level or possessing an 
NLW (either the mid range of 25 meters or the long range of 50 meters) will increase the 
score (as seen by the positive estimate values of 0.93, 0.38, and 0.47, respectively).  
Logically supporting the obvious—U.S. forces will do better the more they can 
differentiate friend from foe. 
Examining the residuals in the model (the errors or difference in value associated 
with each data point to the predicted value/regression line) can reveal inconsistencies, 
especially when there is some heteroscedasticity, which this plot displays in Figure 15.  
Investigation reveals that the majority of these outliers are associated with the unusual 
(but not unlikely) result of a failed Suicide Bomber attempt when the FFW SCU does not 
have an NLW (and therefore scores highly).  The remaining outliers are attributed to 
instances when Insurgents go inside buildings and fire on the SCU (sniper-like).  This 
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Figure 15.  Residual by Predicted Plot 
Lastly, the most significant factors within each Misidentification Level are 
investigated—see Figures 16 through 18.  Within the High and Low Misidentification 
Levels, the most significant factor contributing to the CE score was the success of the 
Suicide Bomber, followed by the NLW Distribution.  Within the Mid-Level 
Misidentification Level, the most important factor is NLW procession (distribution), 
followed by range.  The importance of this revelation is that identifying and neutralizing 
a Suicide Bomber is instrumental to successful SCU UO.  Having the NLWs distributed 
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Figure 18.  Low Misidentification Level’s Most Significant Factors 
F. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
While this analysis has focused on the primary combat implications of NLWs 
(lethality and survivability), it has not considered the value of surrendered personnel, 
especially Hostile Civilians.  The FFW scenario used by this research only vaguely refers 
to Civilians (in the coordinating instructions of the operations order (OPORD):72  “Some 
Civilians in AO are considered neutral.  Some are considered hostile.”  Surprisingly, this 
reference to Civilians is more in-depth than is typical.  How one interprets and models 
hostility can vastly affect the outcome.  This research chose to represent a notional 
number of Hostile Civilians that will attack at a random time.  While this obviously 
                                                 
72 Annex A – A Company/1st CAB OPORD, OFW MAPEX MOUT Vignette Description by the OFW 
ATD Integration and Analysis Team, October 2003. 
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affects U.S. forces’ survivability, what is not captured in the data analysis is the 
survivability of the Hostile Civilians.  One reason for this is because they are virtually 
indistinguishable from the enemy/Insurgents on the battlefield—they are both shooting at 
U.S. forces.  When U.S. forces encounter an unconfirmed/potential target and engage 
with NLWs, all targeted individuals make the decision to be treated as an enemy or as a 
surrendered person (based on compliant or noncompliant actions).  The true 
identity/allegiance may not be known for some time.  Hence the hesitancy of this 
research effort to weigh this aspect. 
To shed some light on the data collected by the design points, surrendered  
Hostile Civilians has been added to Table 13.  There is no question that NLWs lead to the 
surrender of Hostile Civilians (in this simulation).  When addressing only  
Hostile Civilian surrenders, increasing the engagement range of NLWs leads to an 
increase in the number of Hostile Civilian surrenders.  Additional distribution of NLWs 
















Low All Leaders 50 Meters 0.0 0.913 0.125 0.790 
Low All Leaders 25 Meters 0.0 0.963 0.100 0.777 
Low Team Leaders 50 Meters 0.0 0.963 0.150 0.749 
Low Team Leaders 25 Meters 0.0 0.925 0.063 0.733 
Low Team Leaders No NLW 0.1 0.988 0.000 0.731 
Mid All Leaders 25 Meters 0.0 0.838 0.138 0.690 
Mid Team Leaders 50 Meters 0.0 0.813 0.238 0.690 
Mid All Leaders 50 Meters 0.0 0.838 0.288 0.659 
Mid Team Leaders 25 Meters 0.0 0.800 0.163 0.659 
Mid Team Leaders No NLW 0.6 0.725 0.000 0.641 
High All Leaders 50 Meters 0.0 0.890 0.425 0.569 
High Team Leaders 25 Meters 0.2 0.850 0.338 0.567 
High All Leaders 25 Meters 0.1 0.888 0.338 0.564 
High Team Leaders No NLW 0.8 0.863 0.000 0.531 
High Team Leaders 50 Meters 0.0 0.838 0.438 0.518 
Table 13.  Effect of NLW Capabilities at Each Misidentification Level (Hostile Surrenders included) 
61 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
FOR FUTURE STUDY 
If the only tool you have is a hammer, you tend to think of every problem 
as a nail. 
Attributed to Abraham Maslow 
1908-1970 
A. DISCLAIMER 
While this research has attempted to model a capability to be used in combat, it is 
important to note that the data analyzed is from a low resolution and unverified model.  
While every effort has been made to debug the model, improvements in the now 
available Pythagoras version 1.10 will undoubtedly yield better insight when coupled 
with data farming techniques.  While the conclusions of this analysis are made from very 
specific parameters, they must not be overstated.  The author believes this research to be 
a stepping stone to what some may call more responsible warfare. 
B. BOTTOM LINE 
This research finds that U.S military operations, especially the FFW SCU, can 
benefit from the employment of NLWs.  Given supporting Psy-Ops in the area to 
explain/broadcast employment tactics, the use of the proposed NLW (XM303) with 
accompanying tactic (interrogation) will not degrade U.S. survivability.  Contrary to what 
opponents of the use of NLWs in combat believe, NLWs may, in fact, improve 
survivability, especially in the presence of potential suicidal attacks.  Employing NLWs 
can also potentially spare the lives of civilians, neutral and hostile, thereby helping  
U.S. military forces win the hearts and minds of the local populace. 
C. RESEARCH RELEVANCY, INSIGHTS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
The initial motive of this study was to explore whether NLWs could be used 
across the spectrum of military operations.  This is especially relevant in light of current 
operations in Iraq.  A significant challenge is presented to these Soldiers who are tasked 
to conduct combat, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations, often concurrently.  
Without the means to deal with questionable and very stressful situations, one cannot 
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help but wonder (assuming effective use of NLWs) whether there would be fewer 
“incidents” and investigations of the U.S. military for civilian casualties during 
operations in Iraq. 
Ominously, there are also reports of atrocities in other places, committed 
by young soldiers who cracked under the pressure of a war fought on a 
battlefield with no front lines, no easy way to tell civilians from 
insurgents, and no end in sight.73 
In exploring this serious concern, it became quite clear that not only is it a 
challenge to employ NLWs in uncertain conditions, it is also difficult to create realistic 
models.  In light of these multifaceted challenges, some relevant issues, insights, and 
conclusions are categorized and provided below. 
1. Combat Identification 
• Before NLWs can be considered for combat M&S, a framework for 
identification needs be established.  This research has established such a 
methodology and asserts that non-lethal means should only be reserved for 
potential threats to safety and mission accomplishment. 
• The level at which U.S. military forces can confidently differentiate 
combatants from noncombatants (and friendlies) is a critical measure that 
should be factored into planning and operations.  CE scores in this 
research are significantly affected by this ability. 
• Identifying the allegiance of personnel engaged (regardless of means) may 
not be possible.  The local media may, of course, reach their own 
conclusions.  There is an undesirable, but nonetheless real tradeoff 
between inadvertently releasing an enemy or hostile civilian from custody 
                                                 
73 Evan Thomas and Scott Johnson, “Probing a Bloodbath:  The Marines were well prepared for war, 
but not for insurgency.  Did some of them snap—and slaughter innocent civilians in cold blood?” 




(after surrender) and inadvertently engaging a civilian in the wrong place 
at the wrong time. 
• Allegiance of personnel on the urban battlefield can be dynamic.  This 
modeling methodology allows for changing alliances based on events 
(such as a civilian being fired on with lethal means and communicating to 
others—potentially causing a riot). 
2. Hostile Civilians 
• A civilian becomes a combatant the moment hostility is shown, regardless 
of intent.  For the safety of the Soldiers and the unit, these actions should 
(and have, in this study) receive lethal engagement. 
• Hostile civilians are unpredictable and may pose a threat when least 
expected.  One or several Soldiers may safely pass such an individual 
before hostility is displayed.  These individuals are potentially more 
dangerous than a recognized adversary. 
• Suicide bombers are a viable and very dangerous threat.  Having some 
means to interrogate these individuals is essential to safety and mission 
accomplishment.  Misunderstandings (such as misidentifying an enemy 
attack) can jeopardize the mission and the image of the U.S. military.  We 
cannot win the hearts and minds of the locals by improperly engaging 
them with lethal means. 
3. Non-Lethal Weapons (NLWs) 
• This research recommends an NLW that can be employed and supported 
across the spectrum of military operations:  the XM303. 
• NLWs can be used to interrogate/determine intent rather than incapacitate.  
When employment focuses on determining intent rather than delivering 
sufficient force/pain to incapacitate, accidental deaths and animosity are 
greatly diminished. 
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• The success of NLWs may be directly related to the extensiveness of an 
accompanied Psy-Ops campaign explaining said tactics.  Perceived 
intentions of the target are directly tied to compliance or noncompliance in 
accordance with the Psy-Ops guidance. 
4. Simulation Results 
• Blue survivability does not suffer from using NLWs.  Quick, lethal 
response (if noncompliant), superior optics/engagement ability, and  
FFW body armor offset the risk of lethal fire returned by the (once 
unconfirmed) target. 
• An extended range NLW (50 meters) generally yields higher CE scores 
than a 25-meter range or even a greater number of NLWs distributed to 
the SCU. 
• Under conditions when it is difficult to differentiate targets (High 
Misidentification Level), it is advantageous to have more NLWs 
(increased distribution) than extended range. 
• In conditions where it is relatively easy to discriminate friend from foe, 
(Low Misidentification Level), the use of NLWs may cause slightly more 
casualties than not using an NLW.  This is associated with a higher 
probability of noncompliance than the probability of misidentifying.  If 
you shoot enough civilians with NLWs, a few are (unfortunately) bound to 
be noncompliant.  In cases of low misidentification, Soldiers should 
consider this characteristic before employing lethal means. 
• Stopping the Suicide Bomber is crucial to success, especially during  
High Misidentification.  It is not difficult to understand why.  Any NLW 
capability dramatically reduces the chance of a successful suicide attack, 
regardless of identification/misidentification ability. 
• Each increase in NLW capability (distribution and range) results in 
additional Hostile Civilian surrenders. 
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Throughout the tenure of this research, I have generally seen the reactions of 
surrounding military personnel toward the use of NLWs in combat operations change.  
Initial reactions were perceived as a futile (academic) effort whose employment would 
jeopardize the users in combat.  As these personnel became more familiar with the 
proposed employment and tactic, opinions generally changed to increasing confidence 
and support of such a tactic as if it were inevitable and obvious.  This is reminiscent of 
the visit I paid to the JNLWD staff, who informed me that the biggest obstacle to the 
employment of NLWs is lack of education about their use.  Once NLWs and their 
applications are properly understood, they tend to become much better supported and, in 
this researcher’s opinion, doctrinally inevitable. 
Educating individuals on the use of NLWs is a demanding task.  Applications of 
employing NLWs can be difficult—especially in uncertain situations.  Modeling the real 
world circumstances that support the use of NLWs has been a challenge to the military 
M&S community.  While this research effort cannot confidently define the precise 
consequences of NLWs in combat operations, the insights provided hope to spur 
additional work.  This area is relatively uncharted territory and could certainly benefit 
from additional research.  Some suggestions are listed below. 
• Use the increased functionality of Pythagoras version 1.10 to gain 
additional insights through data farming. 
• Investigate how to determine the tactical identification level of regional 
areas and specific operations.  This could assist in tailoring NLW 
employment tactics. 
• Define metrics for cost and benefit of surrendered personnel (neutral, 
hostile, and enemy) to be used for evaluating a more comprehensive CE 
score and for future analytical comparisons. 
• Determine the regional Psy-Ops efforts required to initiate proposed  
NLW tactics. 
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• Increase the range of behaviors in modeling NLWs to better characterize 
hostility and reactions. Improvements should include reactions to getting 
hit with lethal weapons (since civilians could potentially initiate mob 
behavior) and non-lethal weapons (e.g., if an enemy flees to engage at a 
later time) weapons. 
• Adapt a similar identification framework to existing and future M&S. 
• Customize the payload of NLWs to include a dye or irritant to  
dissuade noncompliance. 
E. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Adversaries that are virtually indistinguishable from civilians will likely remain a 
typical phenomenon on the battlefield for quite some time.  As a result, military 
operations must consider both the enemy and the often unwilling participants.  Under the 
provisions of the Law of Armed Conflict, we have an obligation to safeguard 
noncombatants from unnecessary suffering.74  While lethal means must always be the 
default method of force, non-lethal weapons may significantly reduce civilian casualties 
without reducing our combat effectiveness. 
                                                 
74 United States Army, The Law of Land Warfare, Field Manual 27-10, (Washington, D.C.:   
U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), p. 4-13. 
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APPENDIX A – DoD POLICY FOR NLWs 
Department of Defense 
DIRECTIVE 
NUMBER 3000.3 
July 9, 1996 




SUBJECT: Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons 
 
References: (a) Title 10, United States Code 
(b) DoD Directive TS-3600.1, “Information Warfare (U),” 





This Directive under reference (a): 
 
1.1. Establishes DoD policies and assigns responsibilities for the development 
and employment of non-lethal weapons. 
 
1.2. Designates the Commandant of the Marine Corps as Executive Agent (EA) 
for the DoD Non-Lethal Weapons Program. 
 




2.1. Applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military 
Departments (including the Coast Guard, when it is operating as a Military Service in the 
Navy), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the  
Defense Agencies, and DoD Field Activities. 
 
2.2. Applies to all non-lethal weapon development and acquisition programs 
and the employment of fielded non-lethal weapons. 
 
2.3. In general, does not apply to command and control warfare or any other 
military capability not designed specifically for the purpose of minimizing fatalities, 
permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment, 
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even though they may have these effects to some extent. However, for those matters 




3.1. Non-Lethal Weapons. Weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily 
employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, 
permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. 
 
3.1.1. Unlike conventional lethal weapons that destroy their targets 
principally through blast, penetration and fragmentation, non-lethal weapons employ means 
other than gross physical destruction to prevent the target from functioning. 
 
3.1.2. Non-lethal weapons are intended to have one, or both, of the 
following characteristics: 
 
3.1.2.1. They have relatively reversible effects on personnel or materiel. 
 




It is DoD policy that: 
 
4.1. Non-lethal weapons, doctrine, and concepts of operation shall be designed 
to reinforce deterrence and expand the range of options available to commanders. 
 
4.2. Non-lethal weapons should enhance the capability of U.S. Forces to 
accomplish the following objectives: 
 
4.2.1. Discourage, delay, or prevent hostile actions. 
 
4.2.2. Limit escalation. 
 
4.2.3. Take military action in situations where use of lethal force is not the 
preferred option. 
 
4.2.4. Better protect our forces. 
 
4.2.5. Temporarily disable equipment facilities, and personnel. 
 
4.3. Non-lethal weapons should also be designed to help decrease the post-
conflict costs of reconstruction. 
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4.4. The availability of non-lethal weapons shall not limit a commander’s 
inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all 
appropriate action in self-defense. 
 
4.5. Neither the presence nor the potential effect of non-lethal weapons shall 
constitute an obligation for their employment or a higher standard for employment of 
force than provided for by applicable law. In all cases, the United States retains the 
option for immediate use of lethal weapons, when appropriate, consistent with 
international law. 
 
4.6. Non-lethal weapons shall not be required to have a zero probability of 
producing fatalities or permanent injuries. However, while complete avoidance of these 
effects is not guaranteed or expected, when properly employed, non-lethal weapons 
should significantly reduce them as compared with physically destroying the same target. 
 
4.7. Non-lethal weapons may be used in conjunction with lethal weapon 
systems to enhance the latter's effectiveness and efficiency in military operations. This 
shall apply across the range of military operations to include those situations where 




5.1. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, shall have policy 
oversight for the development and employment of non-lethal weapons. 
 
5.2. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements, under 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, shall have policy oversight for the review of 
crisis action and deliberate plans, and shall ensure that the availability of non-lethal 
weapons is considered in their development. 
 
5.3. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology shall 
have principal oversight responsibility for the DoD Non-Lethal Weapons Program, 
including joint Service program coordination to help highlight and prevent duplication of 
development in both classified and unclassified programs. 
 
5.4. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall: 
 
5.4.1. Advise the Secretary of Defense on development and employment 
of non-lethal weapons. 
 
5.4.2. Assess military requirements for non-lethal weapons acquisition 
programs. 
 
5.4.3. Monitor the development of Service non-lethal weapon programs. 
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5.4.4. Develop and promulgate joint doctrine, as appropriate, to 
incorporate emerging capabilities of non-lethal weapons. 
 
5.5. The Commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands shall: 
 
5.5.1. Ensure that procedures exist for the integration of non-lethal 
weapons into operational mission planning. 
 
5.5.2. Identify the warfighting requirements of the Unified Combatant 
Commands. 
 
5.6. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commander in Chief 
of the United States Special Operations Command shall: 
 
5.6.1. Ensure the development and implementation of employment 
concepts, doctrine, tactics, training, security procedures, and logistics support for fielded 
non-lethal weapons systems in accordance with policies defined in this Directive. 
 
5.6.2. Ensure that a legal review of the acquisition of all non-lethal 
weapons is conducted. The review should ensure consistency with the obligations 
assumed by the U.S. Government under all applicable treaties, with customary 
international law, and, in particular, the laws of war. 
 
5.6.3. Ensure that only those non-lethal weapon development programs 
that satisfy the general requirements of technical feasibility, operational utility, and 
policy acceptability are considered for support. 
 
5.6.4. Consistent with existing guidelines on management of acquisition 
programs, establish guidelines to emphasize that non-lethal weapons must: 
 
5.6.4.1. Achieve an appropriate balance between the competing goals 
of having a low probability of causing death, permanent injury, and collateral material 
damage, and a high probability of having the desired anti-personnel or anti-materiel 
effects. 
 
5.6.4.2. Not be easily defeated by enemy countermeasures once 
known; or if they could, the benefits of a single opportunity to use the weapon in a given 
context would be so great as to outweigh that disadvantage. 
 
5.6.4.3. Achieve an effect that is worth the difficulty of providing the 
intelligence support required for mission planning and damage assessment. 
 
5.6.5. Consistent with applicable security guidelines, provide program 




5.7. The Secretary of the Navy shall ensure that the Commandant of the  
Marine Corps serves as the EA for the DoD Non-Lethal Weapons Program. The EA shall 
be responsible for program recommendations and for stimulating and coordinating non-
lethal weapons requirements. 
 
5.8. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, 
Communications, and Intelligence shall: 
 
5.8.1. Establish policy and provide direction for development of the 
necessary DoD informational and intelligence capabilities to enable effective use of  
non-lethal weapons. 
 
5.8.2. Provide policy and guidance when non-lethal weapons matters 
involve DoD information warfare under DoD Directive TS-3600.1 (reference (b)). 
 
5.9. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs shall coordinate and 
approve guidance on public affairs matters concerning non-lethal weapons and their use. 
 
6. EFFECTIVE DATE 
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APPENDIX B – NLW SELECTION CRITERIA 
The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers. 
William Shakespeare, Henry VI 
A. GETTING STARTED 
The primary source (directly referenced or abbreviated throughout this appendix 
unless otherwise noted) used in this selection process is FM 3-22.40 Non-Lethal 
Weapons:  Tactical Employment of Non-Lethal Weapons.  Before diving into selecting 
the most appropriate NLW, it is worth examining the core capabilities and limitations of 
NLWs. 
 1. Core Capabilities 
Core capabilities are those fundamental competencies that enable U.S. forces to 
achieve desired operational objectives.  The core capabilities fall into three major 
categories: counterpersonnel, countermateriel, and countercapability. 
a. Counterpersonnel Capabilities: 
(1) To incapacitate personnel.  Incapacitation is achieved when the 
weapon’s effects render personnel unable to physically or mentally act in a hostile or 
threatening manner and should be reversible through the passage of time. 
(2) To deny personnel access to an area through physical or mental 
discomfort. 
(3) To clear facilities and structures of personnel.  Reduces the 
risks of noncombatant casualties and collateral damage while simultaneously minimizing 
the advantages accruing to an enemy defending a built up area. 
(4) To seize personnel.  Intended to augment lethal means used to 
capture specified individuals. 
 
b. Countermateriel Capabilities: 
(1) Rendering equipment and facilities unusable without complete 
destruction by attacking only weapons of war and supporting infrastructure. 
(2) Disabling or denying the use of vehicles, vessels, and aircraft 
entry into targeted areas or access within an AO. 
 
c. Counter Capability Capabilities: 
(1) Disable or neutralize facilities and systems.  This includes 
disabling/neutralizing electrical generating facilities, command, control, communications, 
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems, Integrated 
Air Defense Systems (IADS), weapons systems, optical sensors, electrical sensors, and 
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navigation capabilities with such controlled effects as to allow for selective, precise 
engagement. 
(2) Deny the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  Mission 
needs include rendering a WMD inoperative; containing the potential release of deadly 
agents/contaminants; and preventing or neutralizing the production, storage, deployment 
(transport), employment, and delivery of WMD. 
 
2. Limitations:  Effectiveness, Perception, and Legality 
a. The effectiveness of NLW is dependent on factors such as motivation, 
age, environmental and human factors, range of engagement, and numerous others.  
NLW can be lethal if improperly applied. Furthermore, countermeasures for thwarting 
virtually all nonlethal options are usually apparent, quickly learned, and readily available.  
Because they are not intended to kill, nonlethal options teach adversaries what to avoid in 
the future. Small unit commanders must prepare to keep one step ahead of belligerents. 
 
b. The perceptual limitation is that personnel may misunderstand the 
appropriate applications of NLW across the range of military operations.  The incorrect 
perception that NLW will allow wars and MOOTW to be prosecuted without casualties 
may lead to conflicting expectations between political and military leaders.  All leaders, 
political and military, involved in planning and executing military missions must 
understand there are no “nonlethal operations.” 
 
c. Some proposed NLW might be forbidden by law or policy. 
Accordingly, it is essential that all NLW developments be evaluated by appropriate 
authorities to ensure they comply with the law of war, U.S. law, and U.S. treaty 
obligations.  Use of NLW containing chemical agents, for instance, must be evaluated in 
the context of the Chemical Weapons Convention.  Also, using RCA in an armed conflict 
requires Presidential approval. 
 
B. NLW SELECTION FACTORS 
In light of the capabilities and limitations of NLWs, five factors were considered 
when selecting an NLW for combat operations:  versatility, ease of employment, 
performance, safety, and others. 
 
1. Versatility:  The NLW must be suitable across the entire spectrum of 
operations, from combat operations and the Global War on Terrorism, to humanitarian 
and peacekeeping operations, to homeland defense.  The typical U.S. Soldier is already 
encumbered with an incredible amount of gear and increasing his/her load must be 
carefully balanced against the benefits provided by additional equipment.  One NLW 
should be capable of handling multiple/different situations.  Logistics support for the 
system and munitions must also be considered. 
 
2. Employment Ease:  Transitioning from lethal fire to non-lethal must not detract 
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from the combat mission.  Soldiers cannot afford to sling their primary weapon in order 
to employ an NLW and thereby create a potential vulnerability. 
 
3. Performance Parameters:  This rather broad category covers things such as 
effective range, accuracy, rate of fire, reload time, weight, etc. 
 
4. Safety and Public Acceptability:  Using an NLW that maims or is perceived to 
have the potential to permanently injure or is deemed cruel will not help us win the hearts 
and minds of the populous.  Included in this factor are the probability of accidental death 
from the munition itself (usually due to range of engagement) and the possibility of the 
Soldier confusing non-lethal means with lethal means during engagement. 
 
5. Other:  Includes system advantages and disadvantages not covered in the 
previous four categories, such as multi-functionality, tailorable effects, training 
requirements, and unambiguous messages sent to targeted personnel. 
 
C. NLW INITIAL SCREENING 
Since this research seeks to model urban combat operations, the most appropriate 
NLW should have a counterpersonnel capability at a range of 25 meters (FFW capability 
requirement) with potential range improvements to 50 meters.  Upon examining the vast 
array of NLWs with a counterpersonnel capability (according to FM 3.22-40, the online 
NLWs Certification course documents, personal interviews with JNLWD and  
Las Angeles Sherriff department personnel, and online), initial screening was done with 
the two most restrictive factors/criteria—Employment Ease and Safety.  The NLW must 
be able to be employed rapidly and safely.  These two criteria essentially demand: 
- lethal and non-lethal means must be available on the same platform 
(M16/M4/M203) 
- transition between lethal and non-lethal cannot involve changing munitions 
- no confusion between lethal and non-lethal munitions 
This restriction eliminated the vast majority of the possible options.  Soldiers 
cannot afford to eject rounds in a weapon and reload with the alternate munition.  Not 
only does this require quite possibly crucial time, it also allows for inadvertently 
confusing the type of munition being loaded, especially during limited visibility.  The 
remaining NLWs for consideration are listed and described below. 
Lightweight Shotgun System (LSS) – The LSS 
is magazine fed and fires all 12 gauge munitions (up 
to 3” shells) to include non-lethal. 
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FN303/XM303 – The FN303 is a semi-
automatic, compressed air launcher, shoulder-fired 
weapon designed exclusively for the employment of 
non-lethal munitions (blunt impact, marking, and OC). 
M203 – conventional M203 that fires 40 mm NL 
munitions, to include:  Crowd Dispersal Cartridge (CDC), 
Sponge Grenade, and Foam/Rubber Baton Round. 
Laser Illuminator75 – temporarily impairs and 
adversary’s ability to fire a weapon.  Loads into a modified M-
203 40mm grenade launcher which can be ejected and replaced 
with a grenade in an emergency.  It briefly illuminates an 
opponent with harmless, low power laser light.  Realizing he 
has been targeted, the aggressor hides or flees rather than risk 
death by fire.  On night operations it can degrade human night 
vision capability and electronic night vision devices. 
Laser Dazzler76 – a high resolution green laser used to 
flash-blind and disorient an aggressor at long range.  Available 
in various sizes, from pen-sized devices to rifle size units. 
D. NLW SELECTION:  FN303 
These five systems were then scrutinized against all five factors and the FN303 
was deemed the most appropriate for combat operations as well as operations across the 
spectrum of conflict.  A few of the key features of the system are listed: 
- very low risk of injury 
- easily supportable 
- fires very rapidly, accurately, and quietly 
- can be used to interrogate a targets intent 
- can use a payload containing dyes (to mark even vehicles) or OC 
A very brief explanation below outlines the deficiencies of the other 4 systems (in 
the opinion of the author): 
LSS – the kinetic 12 gauge rounds have the potential to cause serious injury or 
death from blunt trauma, especially at ranges less than 10 meters (at night in an urban 
environment, this range is not uncommon).  Several are not effective past 20 meters.  
While the LSS is versatile by itself to fire non-lethal and lethal means, the possibility 
arises of confusing the two.  The target and surrounding personnel may be confused of 
                                                 




non-lethal intent because it will be indistinguishable (sound) from a lethal application (an 
observer will hear the discharge and then may see the target drop—unclear which 
munition was used). 
 
M203 – similar to the LSS in that serious trauma or death can occur, especially at 
a range less than 10 meters.  Also can fire both types of munitions (lethal and non-lethal), 
which means they can be confused.  Rate of fire for this system is very slow.  
Logistically, the rounds are cumbersome. 
 
Laser Illuminator/dazzler – are logistically very supportable and conducive to 
interrogation, but are limited during daylight hours.  Not tailorable.  Target must be 
looking at the firer.  Employment intent may not be a clear. 
 
E. FN303/XM303 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION77 
The FN303 Less Lethal Launcher is completely dedicated to reduced lethality and 
liability, the basis of the FN303 concept lies in its ammunition.  The projectiles used are a 
fin-stabilized polystyrene body and nontoxic bismuth forward payload to provide both a 
more accurate and greater effective range than other less than lethal weapons.  Secondary 
effects from projectiles can be delivered via a chemical payload depending on mission 
requirements.  Magazines have a 15-round capacity with a clear rear cover to allow for 
rapid ammunition payload verification.  The 3000-psi compressed air reservoir powers 
the FN303 launcher for an effective range of 50 meters at a point specific target with a 
maximum range of 100 meters.  In addition to the flip-up iron sights, the integrated 
Picatinny 1913 rail can be used to mount red dot sights or other accessories. 
 
 
Figure 1.  XM303 Less Lethal Launcher 
 
The projectiles have been specially designed to break up on impact, thereby 
eliminating any risk of penetration injury.  The four types of projectiles available are:  
training/impact - 100-percent nontoxic glycol base; washable paint - fluorescent pink 
pigment in a nontoxic glycol base; permanent paint - latex-based polymeric paint; and 
Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) - orange-dyed nontoxic glycol base plus 10-percent OC 
(pepper) concentrate at 2 million Scoville Heat Units. 
Additional details and performance measures can be obtained through the  
Human Effects Center of Excellence at the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (see 
slides below regarding this weapon system). 
                                                 
77 FN303 Less Lethal Launcher Urgent Fielding Requirement Safety Assessment, U.S. Army Aberdeen 





Fluorescent pink pigment in a 
glycol base
Training/Blunt Impact
100% non-toxic glycol 
base
¾ Projectiles utilize a fin stabilized 
polystyrene body and non-toxic bismuth 
forward payload
¾Primary effect is trauma from the 
15J/cm3 impact
¾Magazine holds 15 projectiles
Indelible marking
Yellow permanent latex 
based polymeric paint
OC Liquid
Orange dyed non-toxic 





9 Compressed air powered launcher designed to 
fire 0.68 caliber 8.5 g less-than-lethal projectiles
9 Made of Durable, Light-weight Polymer
9 Allows for greater engagement range (100m), 
higher accuracy, and higher rates of fire than 
any currently fielded non-lethal capability
9 In excess of 100 semi-auto shots per air bottle 
9 Both stand-alone and under-barrel (for the  
M16/M4) versions are available
9 Integrated Picatinny rail for mounting red dot 
sights or other accessories.
STATUS
• Rapid Equipment Fielding of 30 systems 
to CTF-180 (Bagram AB, Afghanistan), 
February 2004
• UMR completed for 80 systems to MNC-I
• Limited Safety Confirmation testing has 
been completed




• Point Targets out to 50m 
• Area Target out to 100m
• Deny an area to personnel
• Stand alone or under-barrel version
• Use of Iron Sights Effective out to 50m 
• Use of Optical Sighting (Red Dot) recommended 
over 50m







APPENDIX C – SMALL UNIT TEAM EXPLORATORY 
SIMULATION (SUTES) 
Disclaimer:  The information provided in this appendix was extracted directly from the 
FFW Exploratory Analysis Phase II Report prepared by Robert S. Alexander  
31 July 2005.  It is intended to provide background on the simulation used for previous 
experimentation and analysis as well as for comparisons to the simulation used for this 
thesis research using Pythagoras. 
 
The Small Unit Team Exploratory Simulation (SUTES) was custom-built by the 
analysis team to model FFW Small-Combat Unit operations.  It was intended as an 
interim tool while simulations such as OneSAF and IWARS were built and validated.  
SUTES was built to be a screening tool used to explore a wide range of factors, each 
modeled at a basic level of fidelity.  As such, SUTES is not an engineering model.  In 
general it represents physics implicitly, not explicitly.  For example, it models weapon 
accuracy with tables of inherent error over range, not with a flyout model. 
Basic combat models in SUTES are derived from OneSAF Testbed (OTB).  
Sensor acquisition of targets is modeled by the ACQUIRE target acquisition algorithm.  
The ACQUIRE model considers the thermal or optical contrast of the target with its 
background and compares it with the resolution of the sensor to determine the resolution 
achieved at the measured range.  The sensor resolution achieved is then compared with 
the Johnson Criterion to determine what level of target acquisition (no detect, detect, 
classify, recognize, identify) is achieved. 
Munition accuracy is modeled by inherent error in degrees for each type of 
munition.  This measure serves as the standard deviation σ of a Normal(0, σ) distribution 
from which the actual error is drawn.  Using this error in degrees to compute the error in 
meters at the appropriate range, the damage achieved is determined by referencing a 
Uniform(0,1) random number to a damage probability table which lists probabilities of 
mobility kill, firepower kill, mobility and firepower kill, and catastrophic kill. 
Each entity moves over a path defined by waypoints and legs between waypoints.  
Intended speed is specified for each leg along with other parameters.  The mobility 
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algorithm considers the intended speed of each entity and constrains it by the maximum 
speed allowed by the soil type at the location of the entity. 
Behaviors are scripted, not automated.  Many combat simulations represent 
complex behaviors of entities and units.  Since these behaviors attempt to model human 
decision-making, they are often complex and difficult to encode.  Often these behaviors 
are disappointing in their fidelity.  Rather than embark on a long process of building 
behaviors into SUTES, in keeping with the intent that SUTES be an interim screening 
tool, the deliberate design decision was made to require the user to script most behaviors.  
Therefore, for example, a user will plot waypoints for a squad and cause one fire team to 
wait in an overwatch position until the other fire team completes its bound, instead of 
expecting the simulation to represent a “bounding overwatch” behavior.  One implication 
for analysis using SUTES is that the actions of the users in scripting a scenario are very 
much a part of the analysis itself.  Several reactive behaviors are modeled in SUTES.  An 
entity, upon detecting an enemy, will normally engage the enemy unless his “rules of 
engagement” attribute prevents it.  He will report the entity to others on his radio 
network.  Upon being engaged, an entity will normally go prone and return fire.  When 
nearby friends are engaged, he will react in the same manner.  There is one basic decision 
criteria which an entity can use to choose between one of two branches in his route, 
which is to branch if he is aware of enemy within a specified range.  A supporting 
decision criterion allows entities to branch depending on the branch chosen by another 
entity.  Using this construct, for example, a leader can choose between two branches, and 
his subordinate Soldiers will follow his lead without the need for them to make an 
independent decision. 
An important input to the attrition, target acquisition, and mobility algorithms is 
performance data for the various systems in use.  The performance data used in 
Exploratory Analysis was derived from three sources.  For FFW-specific systems, the 
FFW IPTs provided input.  The most important of these systems was the fused 
thermal/infrared sensor, for which data was provided by DRSOptronics via the Headgear 
IPT.  For systems related to Future Combat Systems, unclassified data from the FCS 
program was used where available.  For other systems, data from the OneSAF TestBed 
(OTB) simulation was used, for example, for PVS-14 Night Vision Goggles. 
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APPENDIX D – ROAD TO WAR 
Disclaimer:  The information provided in this appendix was extracted from the “Study 
Plan Supporting Analysis of the Objective Force Warrior – Night Attack in a Major 
Urban Area” prepared by the Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab, Ft Benning, GA, 23 
June 2003.  It is an abbreviated summary of “Vignette B: Night Attack into an Urban 
Environment” and is intended to provide background to the scenario used for analysis. 
 
Background:  In 2014, twenty years of independence for the Trans-Caucasus States 
found serious socio-political, ethno-religious, and economic conflict spreading through 
the region.  Azerbaijan emerged as the leading economic power through the exploitation 
of Caspian and Central Asian oil reserves. Azerbaijan’s politics were deeply divided; its 
citizens and Karabakh refugees demanded the government take military action against the 
Armenian Karabakh.  The Azerbaijani government refused to act, and refugees from the 
Nagorno-Karabakh Internal Liberation Organization [NKILO], using terror and armed 
force to achieve their goals, began a cross-border campaign designed to force a 
confrontation between the two countries.  Observing these developments, Armenia and 
Iran viewed the Azerbaijani government’s instability as an opportunity for exploitation.  
Armenia began massing maneuver forces along the Azerbaijani border and repositioned 
mobile Theater Ballistic Missile launchers.  Both countries perceived a low risk of failure 
and were willing to impose a military solution upon “the Azerbaijani problem.” 
In late November, the Azeri Islamic Brotherhood (AIB), a coalition of anti-
government factions supported by NKILO and ANFAR military forces, subverted the 
bulk of an Azeri Motorized Rifle Brigade, which mutinied to join them.  The brigade 
seized control of most of the historically significant Icheri Sheher (Inner Town) district 
but a desperate defense by loyal government forces managed to secure the centers of 
government within the city. Meanwhile, two armed clan-based factions of the Azeri 
Islamic Brotherhood, the Aziz and Daha, extended their control of the eastern and 
western outskirts of Baku and intensified their efforts to overthrow the legitimate 
government. 
As a last resort, the Azerbaijani government requested assistance from the 
Russian Federation to defeat the insurgents and preclude an anticipated invasion by 
Armenian forces.  On 15 December, Russia proposed a coalition of US and Russian 
forces to restore order within Azerbaijan and stabilize the government.  Two days later, 
the US agreed to the proposal and the two nations created a coalition force. 
In January 2015, after consultations by the three governments, the President of the 
United States authorized the deployment of Air Force assets into Turkey to establish 
staging bases for the deployment of US forces.  The Army’s expeditionary distribution 
battalion of the expeditionary support force accompanied the Air Expeditionary Force 

























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
83 
APPENDIX E – BASE SCENARIO ORDER 
Disclaimer:  The information provided in this appendix is intended to describe the 
vignette and operations order (OPORD) used by the OFW ATD Integrated Analysis and 
Simulation Team during a October 2003 MAPEX. 
 
A Company/1st CAB (ICV) OPORD 
      Copy 1 of 1 Copy 
      A Company / 1st CAB (ICV) 
      Baku, Azerbaijan (UK813076) 
      ____1700L____NOV 03 
 
OPERATION ORDER 
Reference:  Map, Special series, Baku Azerbaijani 1:250,000 
Time Zone Used Throughout the Order:  LOCAL 
TASK ORGANIZATION: 






A.  Enemy Forces. 
(1) Enemy Activities.  The legitimate government of Azerbaijan has been 
overthrown by the Azari Islamic Brotherhood (AIB) and forced into exile.  The AIB has 
garrisoned small units (Platoon and Squad size) throughout the capital city of Baku to 
secure key elements of power and control the populace.  They have taken control of the 
Government Television and Radio Studio situated on the third floor of the Government 
House (OBJ BLUE), situated 2 miles inland from the bay of Baku, and are broadcasting 
propaganda in their effort to influence the local populace. 
 
(2) Composition, Disposition, Strength/Capabilities 
 (a) Composition.  Each motorized infantry company has 3 platoons 
with 3 squads each.  Each platoon has three BMP-2 armored fighting vehicles.  Each 
squad has 8-10 soldiers.  The AIB also fields guerilla companies of 2 or 3 platoons with  
3 squads each.  Each company is equipped with a mix of communist block weapons 
(AK47s, RPKs, RPG 7/22s, etc).  Limited night vision equipment exists, often distributed 
to squad leaders mission by mission.  The enemy operates with separate heavy weapons 
platoons equipped with 4 x 82mm mortars and 16 surface to air missile launchers  
(SA-18 type). 
 (b) Disposition.  The AIB has positioned a motorized infantry platoon 
near the Government House (OBJ BLUE) with the mission of securing it.  The platoon 
hides the armored fighting vehicles in various garages in the vicinity, moving them daily.  
Security of the Government House rotates among the squads of the platoon. 
 (c) Capabilities/Strength.  The AIB (Azari Islamic Brotherhood) are 
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well trained and capably led.  They are able to conduct operations under all weather 
conditions, day or night.  They are familiar with the terrain and can live off the land with 
the help of the local populace.  The AIB is very adept at conducting centralized 
operations within a large area.  Squad sized elements are expected to influence 
populations in an area in excess of 8 square Km.  They use platoon and company-sized 
caches to re-supply ammunition and medical supplies.  They are capable of surviving off 
of stolen US rations.  Their primary means of re-supply is through the local populace, 
which moves supplies by trucks (civilian and military), or Technical All-Terrain Vehicle 
(ATVs).  The C2 for the AIB is decentralized.  Each squad will have some type of radio 
equipment, but messengers are often used to relay orders.  In addition to captured 
ordinance, the insurgents have homemade mines, booby traps, and hand grenades.  
Expect the AIB to use captured munitions to fabricate all types of booby traps and anti-
handling devices.  The AIB has very skilled 82mm mortar and SA-18 AD teams.  Each 
team is highly drilled at employment and evasion.  The AIB squads are particularly well 
trained in several battle drills, to include the baited ambush, and break contact.  All 
members can be considered expert marksman. 
 
(3) Most Probable Course of Action.  The AIB will continue to patrol in zone 
and attempt to disrupt the movement of US forces through the area.  Upon our entry into 
the AO we can expect the AIB to remain at Level I operations, meaning they will not 
show themselves until the last possible opportunity.  AIB recon teams will seek to 
determine our patterns and attempt to identify weaknesses in the force protection of our 
C2 and logistical infrastructure.  They will also conduct terrorist attacks against 
population centers and civilian leaders, primarily in the Government House area.  They 
will operate in teams and squads, only massing into platoons and companies when they 
need additional combat power.  The mortars and air defense weapons will be used to 
harass and interdict US forces in an attempt to disrupt normal operations and create 
casualties.  They will avoid decisive engagement.  They will fight to retain supply caches, 
C2 sites, and heavy weapons.  Surveillance suggests that the squad securing OBJ BLUE 
is attempting to protect the Government Building from reoccupation by legitimate 
government officials, rather than to defend against a deliberate attack, since the 
occupying squad does not emplace exterior barriers, conduct exterior patrols or man 
observation posts, but patrols the interior halls of the building.  Upon contact, the squad 
conducting building security will most probably defend the TV/Radio studio on the third 
floor, and the platoon defending OBJ BLUE will most probably attempt to reinforce the 
dismounted squad with the platoon’s three armored fighting vehicles and other two 
infantry squads. 
 
B.  Friendly Forces. 
 (1) Higher Headquarters:  1st CAB (IAV) has advanced through BAKU 
along axis of advance Raiders with Recon Company leading.  Upon initial detection of 
the enemy by Recon Company, A Company and B Company passed through Recon 
Company with B Company on the left and A Company on the right.  C Company has 
been given a follow-and-support mission behind A Company.  Recon Company is 
conducting a hasty reorganization eight blocks South of OBJ BLUE.  On order,  
A Company will attack OBJ BLUE, Azerbaijani Government House (HU 123456), to 
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secure the radio and television studio and B Company will attack OBJ GREEN (HU 
113456) to seize key road intersections in order to limit enemy freedom of movement in 
the west-central portion of the city. 
 
INTENT: 
- Prevent the AIB from controlling the key central section of the capital city of 
Baku. 




The A Company will conduct a penetration of OBJ BLUE.  The decisive point is 
the capture of the radio/television station.  This is decisive because it will break the 
OPFOR’s ability to reach the public, and return that ability to the legitimate government.  
Desired end state is the radio/television station secured and operational, and the 
Government House secured. 
 
2. MISSION:  O/O A Company attacks OBJ BLUE vic (HU 123456), in order to 
secure the radio/television station. 
 
3. EXECUTION: 
A. Concept of the Operation.  O/O 1st Platoon seizes OBJ BLUE in order to 
secure the TV/Radio studio, while 2nd and 3rd Platoons occupy positions east, north-east, 
and north-west of OBJ BLUE to block enemy from reinforcing OBJ BLUE.  Decisive to 
this operation is the rapid seizure of the central stairwells and center of the third floor of 
OBJ BLUE 1 (Government House).  This is decisive because it will prevent AIB from 
destroying the radio/television station and allow its control.  3rd Platoon weapons squads 
will provide supporting fires from the roof of Building 6 onto the East Wing of OBJ 
BLUE.  Platoon ARV-Ls will be positioned to control the streets and open area north of 
OBJ BLUE.  1st Platoon ARV-L will be used initially to attack by fire into the first floor 
north entrance of Bldg 1 (OBJ BLUE), and then be controlled by A Company Robotics 
NCO.  Desired end state is the radio/television station in the Government House secured 
and unit postured to defend it from counterattack. 
 (1) Maneuver.  (See Operations Overlays, Figures 1-5).  A Company will 
dismount and move covertly to assault positions south of Buildings 5, 6, and 17, then 
move covertly to initial breach positions.  When platoons report “Ready”, Company 
Commander will initiate a coordinated attack on initial breach targets with the command 
“Execute”.  Following a ten-second delay, synchronized attack of breach targets  
will begin. 
(2) Effects. 
 (a) Preplanned Target Reference Points identified along likely avenues 
of approach. 
 (b) Initial attack of breach targets and supporting fires will be 
synchronized ten seconds following commander’s command “Execute”.  1st Platoon 
ARV-L will attack by fire on the first floor north entrance of Bldg 1, 1st Platoon squads 
will breach their initial entry points, and 2nd and 3rd Platoons will breach their initial 
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entry points. 
 (c) 18 LAMs and 12 PAMs are available for Company use.  2 LAMs 
will be launched when Commander issues the “Execute” command, and will loiter for 25 
minutes.  An additional two LAMs will then be launched and the loitering LAMs will be 
directed to fire at any target of opportunity.  PAMs will be launched at targets of 
opportunity vicinity TRP A100, A101, A102, and A103. 
 (3) ADA Operations.  N/A 
 (4) Intelligence.  UGS Field will be emplaced by Class II UAV north of 
Bldgs 16, 18, and 19, to detect tracked or wheeled vehicles or dismounted personnel 
moving from the north toward OBJ BLUE. 
(5) Electronic Warfare.  N/A 
(6) Engineering.  2nd and 3rd Platoon ARVs will attack by fire to destroy 
manhole covers into under-street tunnels upon the Commander’s “Execute” command.  
1st Platoon ARV under company control will be responsible for manholes on the street 
directly north of OBJ BLUE, but will not attack them until 1st Platoon’s northern squad 
has entered Entry Point BRAVO.  Each shot by 1st Platoon ARV in front of OBJ BLUE 
will be preceded by a check of friendly positions and a notification to 1st Platoon 
personnel to prevent fratricide through north-facing windows. 
(7) Deception.  N/A 
 
B. Tasks to Maneuver Units. 
 (1) 1st Platoon seizes OBJ BLUE in order to secure the TV/Radio studio 
 (a) Position Class I UAV on the roof of building 1 and orient to the 
north. 
 (b) Deploy ARV-A(L) to north side of bldg 1 to attack Bldg 1 first 
floor main entrance by fire.  ARV-L will then be detached to Company control for use in 
blocking enemy reinforcements to OBJ BLUE. 
 (c) Enter OBJ BLUE by three simultaneous breaches into first floor 
north and south, and second floor south via Entry Points ALPHA, BRAVO, and 
CHARLIE.  Clear Stairwells NORTH and SOUTH, clearing rooms as needed to control 
line of communication out of Bldg 1, and seize TV/Radio Studio on the third floor of 
Bldg 1. 
 (d) When TV/Radio Studio is controlled, clear the rest of Bldg 1 and 
be prepared to defend Bldg 1 from armored or dismounted counterattack. 
 (2) 2nd Plt occupies Buildings 2, 14, and 15 and defends in order to block 
enemy forces from reinforcing OBJ BLUE 
 (a) Position Class I UAV on top of Objective Blue (Bldg 1) and orients 
to the North. 
 (b) Deploy ARV-A(L) on the north side of building 14, oriented north 
and east to block reinforcements. 
 (c) Detach 2 SUGVs to Company Robotics NCO. 
(3) 3rd Plt occupies Buildings 4 and 3 in order to block enemy forces from 
reinforcing OBJ BLUE, and supports by fire from the roof of Bldg 6 with one weapons 
squad. 
(a) Position class I UAV on roof of building 3, and orients its sensor to 
the north along building 1. 
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 (b) Deploy ARV-A(L) to the north-east side of building 10, to block 
reinforcements from the north and west. 
(c) O/O attack and clear and seize the first three floors on the west end 
of building 1. 
(d) Occupy support-by-fire position on the roof of Bldg 6 with one 
weapons squad and attack by fire the first floor west-facing windows of the East Wing of 
Bldg 1 during entry of 1st Platoon into Bldg 1.  O/O lift fires from the first floor windows 
and shift to second floor windows.  O/O lift and shift fires to third floor windows.  O/O 
lift fires from Bldg 1 and move to 3rd Platoon positions. 
 (e) Detach 2 SUGVs to Company Robotics NCO. 
 
C. Tasks to Combat Support Units. 
 (1) A Company 1SGT 
 (a) Establish CCP and Log Point at Bldg 22. 
(2) ROBOTICS NCO 
 (a) Maintain OAV fly over route through out the fight. 
 (b) Maintain control of 4 SUGVs from 2nd and 3rd Plt at Log Point as 
replacements. 
 (c) Locate with Company TAC CP. 
 
D. Coordinating Instructions. 
 (1) Company SOP for marking a cleared room. 
 (2) Some civilians in AO are considered neutral.  Some considered hostile. 
 (3) MOPP 0 in effect. 
 (4) All leaders down to squad level will carry Tactical Rules of 
Engagement.  Leaders will brief all soldiers on TACROE NLT 0900L. 
 
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. 
A. Concept of Logistical Support. 
 (1) MULEs will carry all supplies.  They will be located vic Bldg 3. 
 
B. Material and Services. 
(1) Supply. 
 (a) Class I. Ration cycle is MMM.  A Company has its own water.  All 
water in AO is non-potable.  Water from approved sources only is authorized for 
consumption.  Water re-supply through PSG. 
 (b) Class II.  CPOGs unavailable. 
 (c) Class IV.  N/A 
 (d) Class V. TBD 
(e) Class VII.  None available. 
 (2) Transportation.  N/A 
 (3) Services.  N/A 
 (4) Labor. 
 (a) EPWs not authorized to do labor. 
(5) Maintenance.  N/A 
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C. Medical Evacuation and Hospitalization. 
 (1) Aerial evacuation authorized for Urgent casualties only. 
 (2) BAS is in BSA. 
 (3) One MULE per platoon will be unloaded of supplies and used for 
CASEVAC as required. 
 
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. 
A. Command. 
(1) Succession. 
 (a) CO CDR 
 (b) CO XO 
 (c) 1st PLT LDR 
 (d) 2nd PLT LDR 
 (e) 3rd PLT LDR 
(2) Commander with TAC CP (dismounted) south of Bldg 10 till H Hour, 
moves to roof of Bldg 10 at H Hour. 
(3) Main CP (mounted) with vehicles at HU 123436 under control of XO. 
 
B. Signal. 
 (1) COI index 1-9 in effect. 
 (2) Minimum radio transmissions throughout operations. 
 (3) Wire communications not authorized. 
 (4) Recognition signals IA 
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APPENDIX F – FUTURE FORCE WARRIOR OVERVIEW 
Disclaimer: Information provided in this appendix is intended to provide a brief 
background on the FFW program and highlight some current and anticipated technology 
developments used in this research. It was extracted directly from or based on the below 
listed sources.  Major Jon Alt’s thesis research titled “Exploring Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures for a Future Force Warrior Small Combat Unit” provides additional details. 
1) Booz Allen Hamilton, Future Force Warrior CONOPS, Version 1.0, (22 Aug 2005). 
2) Wexford Group International, Inc., The United States Army Future Force Warrior 
Concept Capability Plan for the Small Combat Unit, (Columbus, GA, September 2005). 
3) Capabilities Development Document for Ground Soldier Systems: ACAT I. 
4) Future Force Warrior Engineering Design Evaluation (EDE) #4 Report. 
5) Alexander, Robert S. Future Force Warrior; Exploratory Analysis Phase II 
Report, Future Force Warrior ATD, Fort Benning GA, 2005. 
 
A. FUTURE FORCE WARRIOR PROGRAM (FFW) OVERVIEW 
As the likelihood of US military involvement in large force-on-force engagements 
becomes less and as the Army transforms into the Future Force, more emphasis must be 
placed on the contributions of the individual Soldier.  The Army’s Future Force Warrior 
Program is designed to develop and demonstrate enhanced capabilities for Future Force 
Soldier systems with a goals of a 10x increase in capabilities at the small unit (platoon  
size and below) level.78  FFW is designed to make the Soldier and small unit more lethal 
and survivable on both the current and envisioned future battlefield.79  According to the 
Booz Allen Hamilton, the FFW program is: 
“…the Army’s flagship Science and Technology initiative to develop and 
demonstrate revolutionary capabilities for Future Force Soldier 
systems...FFW notional concepts seek to create a lightweight, 
overwhelmingly lethal, fully integrated individual combat system, 
including weapon, head-to-toe individual protection, netted 
communications, Soldier-worn power sources, and enhanced human 
performance.  The program is aimed at providing unsurpassed individual 
and squad lethality, survivability, communications, and responsiveness—a 
formidable warrior in an invincible team.”80  
                                                 
78 Booz Allen Hamilton, p. 3. 
79 Ibid, p. 2. 
80 Booz Allen Hamilton FFW Small Unit CONOPS Overview presentation, slide 3. 
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The FFW program is an Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) initiative 
intended to improve upon the Land Warrior program and to ultimately become the 
baseline to the Ground Soldier System (GSS).81  The FFW uses an integrated system of 
systems to meet all projected Solider needs thru technology developments.  This type of 
approach is also being used for the transformation initiative for combat/combat support 
platform developments known as the Future Combat System (FCS).  While the FFW is a 
stand alone program, it is designed to be integrated with the current force (Stryker) as 
well as the future forces (FCS).82 
B. FFW COMPOSITION 
The FFW program is designed to be integrated into the existing structure of the 
typical Infantry platoon.  The SCU will cooperatively employ enabling technologies to 
obtain increased lethality and survivability.  The base organization for the FFW SCU is 
three rifle squads and one weapons squad (each squad remains 9-men, see Figure 19) 
with enabling technologies distributed throughout the platoon. 
 
Figure 19.  FFW Platoon Organization with Potential Augmentations83                                                  
81 Capabilities Development Document for Ground Soldier Systems: ACAT I, p. 8. 
82 Booz Allen Hamilton, p. 3. 
83 OFW MAPEX MOUT Vignette Description, Annex A (DRAFT), (OFW ATD Integration Analysis 
and Simulation Team), p. 37. 
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C. POTENTIAL AUGMENTATION EQUIPMENT 
While unmanned systems (briefly described below) are anticipated to be an 
integral piece to the FFW SCU, the exact configuration, distribution, and performance of 
these potential augmentations are not known at this time.  As such, these augmentations 
are explored in MAJ Alt’s research and not included within this NLW exploration. 
Aerial Robotics84 – Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are flown to observe areas 
of interest beyond direct observation of the SCU.  A Soldier is required to monitor the 
UAV’s video feed in order for it to be used by the SCU. 
Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV)85 – A family of systems that include Armed 
Robotic Vehicles (ARVs) (Light, Assault, and RSTA), Multifunction Utility/Logistics 
and Equipment vehicle (MULE) and small UGV (SUGV). 
• ARVs are self-employed robotics used to investigate features to gain and sustain 
information dominance.  ARV-A and -RSTA used provide force protection that 
enhances operational and tactical flexibility.  The ARV-Assault (Light) will be used for 
security and assault support missions where a lighter weight vehicle is required. 
• MULEs provide transport of equipment and/or supplies in support of maneuver. 
• Small UGVs (SUGV) provide the ability to deploy sensors, detect and neutralize 
obstacles, and detect subterranean avenues of approach. 
D. FFW CAPABILITY INCREASES 
Capability increases described below are intended to provide a brief background 
on equipment/capabilities used in this research’s limited FFW modeling.  These 
technology advancements are not intended to reflect the comprehensive suite of weapons, 
equipment, and sensors that are anticipated to be integrated into the FFW SCU. 
Helmet Mounted Sensors:  Fused sensor technology allows images from various 
sensors to be electronically merged and displayed.  FFW is integrating Near Infrared 
(NIR) and Long-Wave Infrared (LWIR, i.e., Thermal) sensors mounted on the helmet to 
fuse images based on visual contrast in low-light conditions with images based on 
thermal contrast.  This technology promises an enhanced ability for an observer to 
understand a scene, with resulting advances in several areas including target detection 
and enhanced mobility during periods of limited visibility.  Leaders and Grenadiers have 
the helmet-mounted fused sensor; others have PVS-14 night vision goggles (NIR). 
                                                 
84 Robert S. Alexander, “Future Force Warrior:  Exploratory Analysis Phase II Report,” Future Force 
Warrior ATD, Fort Benning, GA, 2005. 
85 Wexford Group International, Inc., p. 117. 
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Figure 20.  Helmet Fused Sensor86 
Weapon Mounted Sensors:  All Soldiers have medium-range thermal weapon 
sights.  Automatic riflemen have heavy thermal sights. 
 
Network/Communications Distribution:  Platoon Leader and Plt HQs have the 
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS); Squad Leaders and Team Leaders have both JTRS 
and Soldier Radio Wave (SRW, small form-fit radios) network; Team Leader and below 
have SRW.  This network is an essential piece to the FFW SCU to share information 
continuously and near instantaneously.  It includes embedded navigation systems, blue 
force tracking (BFT), cooperative engagement and handover (not modeled) and 
physiological/health status monitoring (WPSM). 
 
Figure 21.  Warfighter Physiological Status Monitor (WPSM)87 
Survivability:  Integrated battle ensemble with body armor, improved ballistic 





                                                 
86 “Future Force Warrior Engineering Design Evaluation (EDE) #4 Report,” p. 68. 
87 “Future Force Warrior Engineering Design Evaluation (EDE) #4 Report,” p. 13. 
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APPENDIX G – BUILDING THE SCENARIO IN PYTHAGORAS 
Disclaimer:  The information provided in this appendix is intended to introduce the 
reader to some of the data used to model the specific scenario used for this research.  
Implementation and model details are provided by the Pythagoras Users Manual. 
Appendix sections correspond to Pythagoras GUI tabs. 
A. TERRAIN MODELING 
The features comprising the urban environment were attributed in Pythagoras 
(Table 1) to allow for general movement, protection, and cover: 
 
Movement Protection
Feature Factor Factor Visual IR Thermal
General Urban 1 0.4 0 0 0
Road 1 0 0 0 0
Building 0.2 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7
Concealment from
 
Table 1.  Terrain Feature Attributes used for Pythagoras Scenario 
 
Buildings were subjectively degraded to approximate windows and doors, thereby 
allowing movement (in and out), observation, and engagement from openings typical to a 
structure. 
B. WEAPONS MODELING 
The below listed direct fire weapons performance data (Table 2) was obtained 
from AMSAA.  Probabilities were generalized according to family of weapons (i.e., 5.56 
munitions for M16A2, M16A3, M4, etc.).  Classified incapacitation data can be obtained 
though AMSAA.  Indirect systems (to include M203 and Javelin) were not modeled in 
this scenario to reflect a stricter ROE due to civilians in close proximity.  This ROE also 
limits the maximum range use by the weapon systems to 200 meters (600 pixels). 
 
Basic Shots per Max Suppression 
Weapon  Load  Time Step Range Duration 75 150 300 600 900 1200 1500
M4 210 0.5 600 1 0.75 0.63 0.47 0.3 0.22 0.15 0.11
M240 1000 3.33 600 5 0.74 0.61 0.43 0.25 0.17 0.11 0.08
M249 1000 2.83 600 5 0.74 0.61 0.42 0.24 0.16 0.1 0.07
NLW 5 0.25 150 1 0.95 0.95
AK47 1000 3.33 600 4 0.75 0.63 0.46 0.3 0.21 0.14 0.1
RPK74 1000 3.33 600 5 0.74 0.63 0.46 0.29 0.2 0.14 0.09
RPG-7 1 0.07 600 10 1 1 1 0.99 0.92 0.81 0.69
Probaility to Hit at Range (meters)
Table 2.  Weapon Attributes (Converted) for Pythagoras Scenario 
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C. Sidedness Modeling 
As referenced and explained in chapter 5, colors are used to capture allegiance.  
Table 3 reflects (not inclusive) the methodology used to capture unit, friend, neutral, and 
enemy relationships (associated with a high misidentification level, other 2 
misidentification levels use slightly different values).  Table 4 reflects the range (captured 
as tolerance in Pythagoras) of color values assigned to agents in order to utilize an 
identification/ misidentification framework (associated with High Misidentification level, 
other levels use slightly different values).  The resulting identification/misidentification 
probabilities for all levels are displayed in Table 5. 
 
 Unit Friendly Enemy 
Agent Red Grn Blue Radi Red Grn Blue Radi Red Grn Blue Radi Red Grn Blue 
1st Sqd 0 21 254 0 0 0 1 15 1 0 0 239 1 0 0 
3rd Sqd 0 21 248 0 0 0 1 15 1 0 0 239 1 0 0 
HQ 0 21 244 0 0 0 1 15 1 0 0 239 1 0 0 
Insurgent 230 0 70 10 1 0 0 30 1 0 0 170 0 0 1 
Hostile Civ 225 2 101 0 0 0 0 5 0 1 0 16 0 1 0 
Neutral Civ 190 2 130 0 0 0 0 5 0 1 0 20 0 1 0 
Table 3.  Sidedness Attributes for Pythagoras (High Misidentification Level) 
 
Agent Red Green Blue 
1st Sqd 0 21 254 
3rd Sqd 0 21 248 
HQ 0 21 244 
Insurgent 215 – 245 0 60 – 80 
Hostile Civilian 205 – 245 2 101 
Neutral Civilian 125 – 255 2 130 
Table 4.  Range of Color Values to be used for Misidentification Probabilities 
 
Correct Identification 
 High MisID Mid MisID Low MisID 
U.S. to Insurgent 0.20 0.50 0.80 
U.S. to Hostile Civilian 0.15 0.43 0.71 
U.S. to Neutral Civilian 0.88 0.92 0.96 
Table 5.  Identification Probabilities associated with each MisID Level 
 
For example, in Table 5, U.S. forces have a 20% chance of correctly identifying 
an Insurgent under the High MisID (misidentification) level and an 80% chance of 
identifying the Insurgent as a neutral (and therefore not to be engaged with lethal means.  
The rationale is the same for hostile civilians.  Neutral civilians are viewed as neutral 
88% of the time but will be incorrectly identified as an enemy (and engaged with lethal) 
12% of the time.  Insurgents and civilians (hostile and neutral) can clearly identify U.S. 
forces (by uniform and tactical movements) and therefore no not have imperfect 
identification. 
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D. SENSOR MODELING 
 Sensors were modeled within three signature bands/categories: unaided vision, IR 
(infrared), and thermal.  Agents are then assigned devices that have specific range 
dependant probabilities of detection within each signature band.  For example,  
U.S. soldiers equipped with helmet sensor fusion (HSF) have fields of view and detection 
probabilities associated with the integrated night vision (IR) and thermal sensors (using 
existing equipment capabilities combined to represent the future HSF anticipated 
capability).  The actual performance data was obtained through AMSAA (who used the 
ACQUIRE algorithm for calculating the probability of detecting a man-sized target in 
southwest Asia).  This unclassified data is available upon request (from AMSAA) and is 
too extensive to include in this appendix. 
E. COMMUNICATION MODELING 
 Communication is modeled in Pythagoras the same way as sensors.  For purposes 
of this research effort (communication is not a research concern), this 
feature/functionality was bypassed with an agent communication attribute that allows 
team members to always know about other unit members. 
 
F. AGENT MODELING 
 
Perhaps the most extensive modeling effort involves assigning equipment 
(weapons, sensors, and communication devices) and attributing individual characteristics 
to each agent in order to represent actions, behaviors, desires, and reactions.  All agents 
must be assigned at least one weapon, one sensor, and communication device (see 
Chapter V, Table 1 for assignments).  The ability to use their assigned equipment can be 
varied, but this research effort did not investigate these impacts and therefore did not 
degrade any agent’s performance.  In order to capture a randomly timed attack by hostile 
civilians, they were assigned a desire to hold fire (0.9). 
Initial positions (which were varied for all but U.S. forces) were then selected to 
each agent, along with a series of waypoints and terrain preferences/desires to model 
movement.  Assigning movement desires enabled coordinated small team (tactical) 
movements.  The speed at which the agent moves through the urban environment is 
calculated according to doctrinal movement rates (see Table 6).  The Agents movement 
rates were converted to Pythagoras units with a corresponding degradation rate to 
approximate movement through an urban environment at night.89 




Table 6.  Unopposed Movement Rates90 
 
1 timestep= 2 seconds
4.0km 1 hr 1000m 1 min* * * 1.48km/time step
















Figure 2.  Normalized Movement Degradation to account for Night Movement 
 
Attributes can be used to model vulnerabilities from lethal and non-lethal fire.  
Since FFW Soldiers wear improved body armor, their vulnerability to lethal fire was 
reduced over 11% (see calculations in Figure 3). 
 
Vulnerability Reduction Based on Surface Area
(%Abdomen * % Coverage) + (%Thorax * % Coverage) + (%Head/neck * % Coverage) = 
(10.6%*22%)+(13%*31%)+(6.5%*50%) = 9.6% Reduction in Vulnerability
FFW Armor 18% More Coverage Area
9.6% + (9.6%*18%) = 11.34% Reduction in Vulnerability 
 
Figure 3.  Vulnerability Reduction Calculations for Improved Body Armor91 
 
 Also within this tab is an agent’s vulnerability to color changes.  NLWs were 
modeled as a color weapon that essentially pains its targets with color.  A threshold value 
(13) for a color (green) would trigger an agent hit/painted by an NLW to surrender.  Each 
                                                 90 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 90-31, AMCI Army and Marine Corps Integration in 
Joint Operations, (HQ, Department of the Army, 2002). 
91 Actual values and calculations were obtained from Mr. Lew Farkas at AMSAA. 
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category of agent (insurgent, hostile civilian, and neutral civilian) was assigned different 
vulnerability values to capture a subjectively determined probability of surrender (see 
Table 7).  If an agent did not surrender, it would attempt to return (lethal) fire (if the 
agent possessed a weapon) but would also be immediately targeted by lethal means from 
U.S. forces. 
 
Agent Surrender Probability 
Insurgent 0.25 
Hostile Civilian 0.75 
Neutral Civilian 0.90 
Table 7.  Surrender Probability of Agents Hit with an NLW 
 
G. BEHAVIOR MODELING 
 An agent’s behavior can be programmed or changed though the use of triggers.  
Events that trigger behavior changes can range from detecting types and/or numbers of other 
agents, completing an action (arriving at an objective), to being shot at or running low on 
ammunition.  This functionality allows for fairly complicated and robust set of interactions 
and coordinated operations.  The process of modeling behavior is one of trial and error in 
order to approximate what the user believes to be realistic.  The extent and description of all 
the behaviors and associated triggers used in this scenario, as well as additional details of this 
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